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Abstract 
Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries (SDT) constitutes a central feature of the 
GATT/WTO system. Its formal goal is to foster export-led growth in developing countries. Its 
theoretical foundations and empirical support are, however, weak at best. In particular, SDT conflicts 
with the GATT's two key principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination, compromising the efficiency 
of the multilateral trading system. Still, if SDT provisions help those who most need help, sacrificing 
economic efficiency may be justifiable. However, there are numerous criticisms, on theoretical and 
empirical grounds, to the premises and the achievements of SDT-based disciplines, casting serious 
doubt on its effectiveness in helping developing countries trade and grow. For researchers, the good 
news is that there is plenty of room for progress, with several important areas where our understanding 
remains unsatisfactory but progress is feasible---that is, where the expected return to research effort 
seems unusually high. 
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1 Introduction
Special and Diﬀerential Treatment for Developing Countries (SDT) is a staple of the
world trading system. It is present in many forms. For example, members of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) can sidestep the nondiscrimination requirement
established in Article I of the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT),
which establishes Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) treatment among its members, to
oﬀer preferential access to developing countries. Similarly, developing countries need
not adhere to all the agreements in the GATT, have more time to implement them,
and have a lower level of obligations. The underlying justiﬁcation is that those coun-
tries could beneﬁt from temporary protection to foster infant industries and diversify
their industrial base. This process would be strengthened by the scale economies
obtained through preferential access to larger markets. Intriguingly, despite its obvi-
ous relevance this is a topic that has received relatively little attention in the trade
literature in the last 20 years.1
The formal goal of SDT is to foster economic growth of developing countries. But
is SDT actually good for growth? Unfortunately, answering this question convincingly
is extremely diﬃcult, theoretically and especially empirically. Alternatively, one may
investigate ancillary questions that could provide inputs to help assess the impact of
SDT on growth. For example, a necessary (but not suﬃcient) condition for an answer
in the aﬃrmative is that SDT causes a sustained growth in the exports of developing
countries. If SDT does not even aﬀect their export performance in a sustained way,
then it surely cannot encourage economic growth either. Similarly, we can look at
the eﬀect of SDT provisions on the trade policies of countries, rich and poor. If SDT
makes the world less protectionist in the long term, it may achieve its goals eventually;
otherwise, the task would be much harder.
Still, reaching solid conclusions about the virtues and vices of SDT constitutes a
formidable challenge. Even if an ancillary issue can be convincingly assessed, gener-
1Much of the earlier literature on SDT is collected in the volume edited by Hoekman and Ozden
(2006).
1
alizations about the desirability of SDT would require caution. For example, if one
ﬁnds that nonreciprocal preferences oﬀered by developed countries do not help to cre-
ate viable industries in developing countries, then we may conclude that it can only
provide a temporary increase in income, or ‘rents’ from the higher price attainable
in the foreign markets. Yet even if it does help to create viable industries, one must
still ask at what cost to donors, recipients and the rest of the world. The beneﬁt to
some developing countries could happen, for instance, at the expense of other devel-
oping countries through trade diversion. One may also question the cost eﬀectiveness
in terms of the burden to consumers/taxpayers in donor countries. Much also de-
pends on how the additional income is distributed within the recipient economies,
and between donor and recipient countries.
Those diﬃculties notwithstanding, in this chapter I address the main themes sur-
rounding SDT by examining the (rather limited) literature whose focus is on SDT,
while (somewhat diﬀerently from previous reviews of SDT) also borrowing insights
from other lines of research in international trade. Speciﬁcally, I seek to answer the
following main questions:
1. Is SDT justiﬁable, theoretically and/or empirically?
2. Can/do nonreciprocal preferences provide a sustainable boost to the exports of
developing countries?
3. Can/does SDT promote growth in developing countries?
4. Do nonreciprocal preferences to developing countries induce them to adopt more
liberal trade policies?
5. Do nonreciprocal preferences to developing countries induce the preference-
granting countries to adopt more liberal trade policies?
To avoid setting expectations too high, let me be clear from the outset: I will
not be able to answer those questions very satisfactorily. Still, for the more anxious
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readers I can provide some short, unqualiﬁed answers. Those would be, respectively,
“hardly,” “maybe,” “unlikely,” “hard to say,” and “no.”
Throughout the chapter, I will qualify those short answers relying on the litera-
ture directly aimed at SDT issues, as well as on the research that does not target but
that helps us understand the consequences and the desirability of SDT disciplines.
I also examine other, more speciﬁc questions related to SDT. In the discussion, it
will become clear that we need more research on this topic. Throughout the text,
and especially in the conclusion, I will emphasize the speciﬁc areas in which knowl-
edge is lacking but a better understanding is feasible. I should note that, when
discussing the consequences of developed countries’ nonreciprocal preferences to de-
veloping economies, I concentrate on the latter. The reason is that research on the
consequences of nonreciprocal preferences granted by developed countries on devel-
oped countries themselves is rather scarce (except for the small but interesting re-
search on the consequences of nonreciprocal preferences for the trade policy of the
donor countries, which I do discuss).
I start with an overview of the institutional setting deﬁning SDT in the world
trading system. In section 3, I discuss the theoretical analyses of the rationale and of
the possible consequences of SDT. In section 4, I review the existing empirical analyses
that help us assess the impact of SDT disciplines. I ﬁnish the chapter summing up
what we know about the consequences of SDT, with suggestions for future research
aimed at the issues where our understanding remains unsatisfactory but progress is
feasible.
2 The institutional setting
Historically, the GATT has been very permissible with developing countries. They
have not been expected to fully reciprocate market concessions in multilateral negoti-
ations, and were not required to subscribe to new disciplines. On the other hand, the
nondiscrimination principle ensured that all liberalization carried out by developed
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economies were extended to them.
Several articles of the GATT codify such special and diﬀerential treatment. The
three articles of Part IV of the GATT–which was not in the original agreement
but was added in 1965–are concerned solely with the development needs of devel-
oping economies, and especially with those of least developed countries (LDCs). For
example, Article XXXVI explicitly allows nonreciprocity in liberalization vis-à-vis
developing countries due to their special needs. But such exceptions are not con-
ﬁned to Part IV. For example, Article XII (on Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance
of Payments) permits developing countries to use quantitative trade restrictions for
balance-of-payments purposes, whereas Article XVIII (on Government Assistance to
Economic Development) allows LDCs to engage in infant-industry protection with
both tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers.2
Such provisions have historically been interpreted rather liberally, eﬀectively grant-
ing developing countries signiﬁcant leeway in the design of their trade policies. This
has resulted, for example, in considerably lax liberalization commitments by develop-
ing countries in GATT negotiations, reﬂected in a relatively small share of products
with tariﬀ bindings and in large diﬀerences between applied and bound tariﬀs (a “tar-
iﬀ overhang,” in WTO parlance, sometimes also referred to as the amount of “water
in the tariﬀ”) when tariﬀs are bound.
Table 1 illustrates those points. The table shows the percentage of tariﬀ lines
bound, the bound and applied (simple) average tariﬀs, and their diﬀerence for a
developed economy (the U.S.), three large emerging economies (Brazil, India and
China), and four smaller developing countries, two in Sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria
and Angola) and two in South Asia (Thailand and Vietnam). Among the emerging
economies, Brazil and India are original signatories of the GATT, whereas China
joined the WTO only in 2001. Among the other developing countries in the table,
two are old members of the GATT (Nigeria and Thailand) whereas the other two
2Chapter 5 of this Handbook oﬀers a discussion of the legal aspects of special and diﬀerential
treatment for developing countries.
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joined either at the end of the Uruguay Round (Angola) or more recently (Vietnam).
Within that group, Angola and Thailand have about the same level of income per
capita, whereas the other two are signiﬁcantly poorer.
Six regularities stand out in Table 1. First, and most obviously, developing country
tariﬀs, bound and applied, are considerably higher than those in developed economies,
like the U.S. Second, products that are typically considered exporting products of
developing countries, like agricultural items, clothing and textiles, face duties signiﬁ-
cantly higher than average in the American market.3 Ironically, this is also the case
in the markets of developing countries themselves, and in fact this asymmetry across
product types is more pronounced there. For example, tariﬀs on agricultural products
are on average bound at below 5% in the U.S., but above 100% in India and at 150%
in Nigeria; textile and clothing items are bound respectively at averages of 8% and
12% in the U.S., but at 60% in Angola. A qualitatively similar pattern is observed
in applied tariﬀs.4
The situation changed somewhat during the Uruguay Round (UR) of multilateral
negotiations, when SDT was viewed as an outdated concept in need of change. One of
the goals of the UR was precisely to integrate developing countries into the rules of the
world trading system. As a result, during the UR developing countries were required
to liberalize and to adapt their trade procedures to GATT rules and obligations to
an extent not observed in previous rounds. They no longer could opt out of the
agreements, a requirement of the Single Undertaking negotiation method, although
they were still allowed longer periods to comply. Furthermore, new acceding countries
became subject to considerably more stringent liberalization accession requirements
3Further illustrating this point, Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga (2002) show that developed coun-
tries’ tariﬀ preferences to developing economies are smaller and less frequent in products subject to
tariﬀ peaks, which are precisely the products in which developing countries tend to have comparative
advantage.
4Those observations follow the discussion in Bown (2009).
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since the UR. The Chinese accession is the most salient case, but this was a general
change that aﬀected the accession rules of all developing countries.
The other four regularities in Table 1 reﬂect this change in perspective. First, the
countries that have not bound all their tariﬀs are old, developing GATT members.
Strikingly, Angola (which joined in 1994) has bound all its tariﬀs, but Nigeria (a
Sub-Saharan African nation like Angola, but a member since 1960) has bindings on
only 19% of tariﬀ lines, and Thailand (with the same GDP per capita as Angola
but a member since 1982) on 75% of tariﬀ lines. Second, the average bound tariﬀ is
signiﬁcantly lower for more recent members than for similar countries that have been
members for a longer period. For example, China’s average bound tariﬀ is 10%, but
other large emerging economies have substantially higher average bounds: Brazil’s
is over 30% and India’s is almost 50%. Similarly, Nigeria’s average bound tariﬀ is
twice Angola’s and over ten times Vietnam’s, which is poorer but a newcomer to the
WTO. Vietnam’s average bound tariﬀ is also less than half of its richer but old GATT
member neighbor Thailand. An analogous but signiﬁcantly less pronounced pattern
is observed with respect to the average applied tariﬀs.
A ﬁnal regularity reﬂects the previous two: the average tariﬀ overhang is typically
substantially larger for old developing member countries than for more recent ones.
For example, while Brazil’s average tariﬀ overhang is around 18 percentage points
and India’s is twice that level, China hardly has any “water” in its tariﬀs: its average
tariﬀ overhang is of the same size as that of the U.S.–almost zero.
It is important to observe that those regularities are not a peculiar feature of the
countries in Table 1. Rather, the economies featured in the table were chosen precisely
to illustrate general patterns of the trade policy of WTO members. Those general
patterns can be documented more systematically with a simple linear regression like
yj = α+ β1Developingj + β2 (Developingj × URj) + β3 ln(GDPpcj) + ǫj, (1)
where Developingj is a dummy for non-high income economies (i.e., countries with
gross national income per capita below $12,616) in 2013 according to the World Bank
classiﬁcation (http://data.worldbank.org/news/new-country-classiﬁcations), URj is
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a dummy for GATT/WTO members that joined since 1993, near the end of the
Uruguay Round, and GDPpcj is the 2013 GDP per capita from the World Bank.
I use four diﬀerent dependent variables: the percentage of tariﬀ lines bound and
countries’ (simple) average tariﬀ, average bound tariﬀ and average tariﬀ overhang, all
in 2013 according to the WTO (http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx). Table
2 shows the results from estimating equation (1) using only the dummy for developing
countries, for all products and for three speciﬁc sectors (agriculture, clothing and
textiles). In Table 3 I add the other regressors but only run the regressions for all
products.
The tables conﬁrm that the regularities illustrated by Table 1. From Table 2 it
is clear, ﬁrst, that in general developing countries have signiﬁcantly higher bound
and applied tariﬀs than developed economies–almost twice as large. Second, as a
comparison of the estimates of the regression constant indicate, developed countries’
applied and bound average tariﬀs are signiﬁcantly higher in agriculture and clothing
(although not in textiles) than in other sectors. This pattern is also observed in the
applied and bound tariﬀs of developing countries (textiles included).
Likewise, it is clear from Table 3 that the developing economies that have been
GATT signatories before 1993 have much fewer tariﬀ lines bound than developed
economies, but that this is not true for developing economies that joined since 1993. In
fact, column 1 shows that developing countries that are new members have on average
slightly more tariﬀ lines bound than developed economies. Furthermore, as column 5
shows, the higher average bound tariﬀs of developing countries are largely limited to
those that are old signatories of the GATT. A similar but smaller diﬀerential eﬀect is
present for the applied tariﬀs (column 3). Finally, the “excess” of tariﬀ overhang in
developing countries virtually vanishes when one looks at those who joined since 1993
(column 7). The even columns of Table 3 show a similar pattern after controlling
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for GDP per capita, which has the expected eﬀects (richer countries have more tariﬀ
lines bound, lower applied and bound tariﬀs, and less water in the tariﬀ).5
Now, the UR-sponsored changes mentioned above notwithstanding, with the onset
of the Doha Round (or informally, the ‘Development Round’) of trade negotiations the
view that developing countries should be treated diﬀerently resurfaced. A consensus
seems to have developed among WTO members that the UR requirements were too
stringent and too costly to implement for poor countries. Illustratively, at the launch
of the Doha Round WTO ministers stated that a central goal of the negotiations
was "to improve the trading prospects [and to] ensure that developing countries, and
especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in the growth of world
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development."6 As a result,
eﬀorts to broaden market access for LDCs and to lower the costs of implementing the
UR new disciplines have been at the center of the Doha Round negotiations.
2.1 GSP and other nonreciprocal arrangements
Although SDT encompasses a wide range of clauses and rules distinguishing the
treatment of developed and developing economies in the world trading system, its
most salient dimension is arguably the developed countries’ nonreciprocal system
of preferences, of which the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is the most
extensive.
The idea of a GSP was initially suggested in 1964, at the ﬁrst United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD I). Its goals would be to increase
the export earnings, to promote industrialization, and to accelerate the growth of
5One can also observe (in results not shown) that the eﬀect of new (post 1993) accession on the
trade policies of developing countries is heterogeneous across sectors. The heterogeneity suggests that
new accession implies, in addition to lower applied tariﬀs, either more bindings coverage or, when
coverage is already extensive, lower bound levels. In agriculture, new accession has no distinguishable
eﬀect on bindings coverage–which is almost 100% in most countries anyway. On the other hand,
its eﬀect on the levels of bound tariﬀs and of the tariﬀ overhang is more than thrice the eﬀect on
non-agricultural sectors. In contrast, for textiles and clothing new accession has a particularly strong
eﬀect on bindings coverage, but no discernible impact on the bound levels.
6http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm#declaration.
8
developing countries. In the subsequent year, GATT Contracting Parties formally
amended the agreement to recognize ‘the special economic needs of developing coun-
tries’ and allow nonreciprocity. In 1971, they waived Article I for developing countries
for ten years, explicitly authorizing "temporary" more favorable tariﬀ treatment to
their exports. The initially temporary more favorable treatment became permanent
in 1979 after the Tokyo Round of negotiations, under the ‘Enabling Clause’ (formally
the "Decision on Diﬀerential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries"), which provides the WTO legal basis for GSP.
Since then, GATT members were allowed to grant tariﬀ preferences to developing and
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) without having to extend the same treatment to
industrialized countries.7
The Enabling Clause is ostensibly vague on the range of goods and the list of
countries that should, or could, be contemplated by preference-granting countries.
Accordingly, preference-granting countries enjoy signiﬁcant discretion for picking-
and-choosing beneﬁciary countries and eligible products. One consequence is the wide
discrimination across recipients. This contrasts with the original goals of UNCTAD,
which stated that the preferences should be nondiscriminatory across the beneﬁcia-
ries, except that LDCs may be oﬀered better treatment. Nevertheless, this guideline is
often disregarded without meaningful consequences for the preference-granting coun-
tries. Furthermore, unlike most other GATT concessions, GSP can be changed or
7The Enabling Clause also provides the WTO legal basis for the Global System of Trade Prefer-
ences among Developing Countries. As the name suggests, it regulates preferences among developing
countries. In force since 1989, it currently has 43 signatories. It allows widespread discretion in terms
of the depth and width of the preferences. However, and perhaps because of its permissibility, in
practice the typical member of the system oﬀers only small preferences in a few dozen products.
Similarly, the Enabling Clause made it GATT-compatible for developing countries to form free trade
areas (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs) without the need to comply with requirements of GATT’s
Article XXIV. That article establishes that the formation of such trading groups is allowed provided
that members eliminate trade barriers on “substantially all” trade between them within a “reason-
able length of time,” and that “on the whole” they do not raise trade barriers on nonmembers.
Although the requirements are rather vague, they at least provide some guidelines to discipline the
formation of FTAs and CUs; if the agreement is notiﬁed to the WTO under the Enabling Clause,
the guidelines can be sidestepped altogether.
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withdrawn at any time, at the will of the donor country.8
The Enabling Clause also presumes that preferences should be oﬀered on a non-
reciprocal basis. Nevertheless, eligibility (or eligibility to wider or deeper preferences)
is often linked to ‘good behavior’ in nontrade areas by the candidate countries. Al-
though some sort of reciprocity has always been present, it has become more explicit
over time. For example, when justifying deeper preferences for some countries un-
der its “GSP+” program, the European Commission (2014) explicitly states, “since
2005, the scheme has taken up a new role: to provide incentives to those vulnerable
countries committed to promote sustainable development and good governance,” and
after the last revision “the E.U. has provided for more incentives for countries to join
the GSP+ arrangement, while at the same time enhancing its monitoring to ensure
those rights and principles are eﬀectively respected” (emphasis in the original). Thus,
in reality Enabling-Clause “nonreciprocity” may be deﬁned more appropriately as
“nontrade reciprocity.” Accordingly, although I will keep referring to those programs
as “nonreciprocal agreements” throughout the chapter to follow conventional termi-
nology, it should be understood that whereas they are nonreciprocal with respect to
exchange of market access, they often require some other type of reciprocity.
Another prominent feature of developed economies’ nonreciprocal arrangements
with developing countries is their rules of origin (ROOs) requirements. Essentially, to
export under a certain preferential scheme an exporter typically needs to show that a
share of the shipment’s value added has been generated in countries that qualify for
the same preference. Otherwise, the shipment is deemed ineligible for the preferential
rate. This raises two problems. First, documentation costs can be relatively high,
especially for occasional exporters and when the preferential margin is small. Second,
the growth of global value chains worldwide underscores the importance of eﬃcient
sourcing strategies. If a ﬁrm is restricted to source from developing economies under
the same nonreciprocal arrangement, in many instances this will have adverse conse-
8See Grossman and Sykes (2005) for an excellent discussion of the European and American GSP
programs, and of the legal and economic aspects regarding discrimination across devoping countires
under the Enabling Clause.
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quences for the ﬁrms’ productivity. Firms may instead decide to forgo the preference
so that they can source eﬃciently and do not need to incur in documentation costs.
Therefore, demanding rules of origin requirements tend to reduce the gains from the
preferences oﬀered to developing country exporters by simply inhibiting their use.9
Currently, all developed countries have their own GSP scheme, as well as other
programs of (supposedly) nonreciprocal preferences. Since the 2000s, some devel-
oping countries have also started their own GSP programs. They focus on LDCs
but are typically limited in scope. In the Appendix, Table A.1, we list the existing
multi-country Enabling Clause-based programs of preferential access, including their
starting year, current number of beneﬁciaries and key features. Table A.2 provides
the main online source of information for each program.
Now, despite the proliferation of the programs of unilateral trade preferences, due
to the size of their economies the American and the European remain by far the most
important. Accordingly, we provide below a more through account of their programs,
brieﬂy describing their breadth, depth, main features, and the nature of the required
nontrade reciprocity from beneﬁciaries.
2.1.1 The American nonreciprocal arrangements
The GSP of the United States took eﬀect on January 1976. It currently oﬀers duty-
free access on around 3,500 tariﬀ lines to 122 countries. Another 1,500 tariﬀ lines are
included for 43 LDCs. Its statute speciﬁes various criteria under which a developing
country may not qualify–being ‘communist,’ expropriating U.S. citizens, not recog-
nizing worker rights, not recognizing intellectual property rights, allowing child labor,
etc. Countries in those categories may be taken out, permanently or provisionally,
fully or partially, from the recipients’ list. The American GSP also excludes several
sensitive items. Some statutory exclusions are explicit (e.g., ‘watches’) whereas others
allow for more discretion (‘import-sensitive electronic articles’).
9The World Trade Organization (2014) provides an account of the many hurdles LDCs face in
fulﬁlling ROOs requirements. It also explains the diﬃculties in comparing the stringency of diﬀerent
ROOs systems, since they often vary in several dimensions.
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The program needs periodical renewal by Congress. Historically, there have been
several periods during which it was temporarily suspended due to lack of authoriza-
tion by Congress, although it has always been renewed retroactively, with duties paid
during expiration periods been reimbursed to exporters after re-authorization. Re-
markably, such retroactive payments have always taken place despite the lack of a
statutory requirement imposing them.
In addition to GSP, the U.S. currently has two other major non-GSP schemes
of nonreciprocal preferences: the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, in
force since 2001) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI, launched under a diﬀerent
name in 1983 and expanded in 2000).10 The beneﬁciaries of the non-GSP programs
are usually GSP beneﬁciaries. A key diﬀerence is that they receive broader preferences
than they would under standard GSP. AGOA also provides more ﬂexibility (to some
members) in terms of compliance with rules of origin.11
The top portion of Table 4 details the breadth and depth of the main American
nonreciprocal programs. Over a third of the tariﬀ lines are already zero on an MFN
basis. Relative to the tariﬀ lines with strictly positive MFN duties, regular GSP
beneﬁciaries can export duty-free in just over half of them. LDCs have duty-free
access in an additional 21.5% of dutiable tariﬀ lines. AGOA and CBI beneﬁciaries
have even broader access, being able to export around 40% more products duty-
free to the American market than regular GSP beneﬁciaries countries are allowed to.
Table 4 also distinguishes between agriculture (where several developing countries
have comparative advantage) and non-agricultural products. It is worth noting that
only in about 21% of agricultural products there is duty-free MFN access to the
American market. Moreover, regular GSP beneﬁciaries have preferences in just about
10The CBI has two main tiers: CBERA and CBTPA. Members of the latter are oﬀered duty-
free access in about 5% more tariﬀ lines than members of the former. Under CBTPA, there are
also subprograms that oﬀer additional beneﬁts to Haiti regarding the exports of certain textile and
apparel goods.
11Under the Special Rule for Lesser Developed Countries, AGOA members with GNP per capita
below US$1500 in 1998 can source fabrics from anywhere in the world without needing to reach a
minimum local content requirement to qualify for the preference when exporting apparel products.
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40% of the dutiable agricultural goods. Countries included in the broader programs,
on the other hand, are eligible to export duty-free a larger fraction of agricultural
than of non-agricultural dutiable products.
The breadth of the American GSP program has been relatively stable over the
last two decades, as Figure 1 shows. After a drop in the late 1990s, the number
of GSP-eligible tariﬀ lines has ﬂuctuated just around 50%-51% of the total nonzero
MFN tariﬀ lines.
The top portion of Table 5 shows instead the importance, in terms of trade value,
of the imports entering the U.S. under its nonreciprocal arrangements. It makes
clear that, from the perspective of the U.S., the preferences do not have a major
impact: the imports that are eligible for preferences under all of its nonreciprocal
programs combined amount to less than 3% of the value of the American imports (or
about 5% of the American imports of dutiable products). Observe also that these are
the ﬁgures for eligible imports; if one considers only the imports that actually claim
preferences, the proportion would be signiﬁcantly smaller, as I discuss in section 4.2.3.
The corresponding values for agricultural products are only slightly higher.
Interestingly, although the number of GSP-eligible tariﬀ lines has remained roughly
constant since 2000 (Figure 1), their relative importance has changed more signiﬁ-
cantly. This is especially true for agricultural products, as Figure 2 illustrates. Reach-
ing over 12% of the value of all dutiable agricultural imports in 1997, and remaining
above 10% until 2006, that ﬁgure has declined to just 5% in 2014.
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In addition to the requirements in nontrade areas mentioned above, countries
‘graduate’ if they reach a certain level of income, in which case they lose the right
to preferential access. Furthermore, a product-country pair may be excluded as well
if there is no longer a ‘competitive need,’ where the competitive need limit (CNL)
is deﬁned by a monetary threshold or as a percentage of American imports of that
product in a year.12 By construction, exclusions under this criterion target precisely
the most successful exporters.13
2.1.2 The European nonreciprocal arrangements
The European GSP system is the oldest, beginning right after the initial GATT
authorization in 1971. It has been revised several times since then, but the current
system, implemented on 1 January 2014, will last for 10 years without revision (rather
than being revised every 3 years, as it had been the case until 2013).
The current system has three main categories: standard GSP, "GSP+" and
"Everything but Arms" (EBA) arrangements. The ﬁrst oﬀers tariﬀ reductions from
15% to 100% of the MFN tariﬀ. Thus, unlike the American program, GSP eligibil-
ity in the Europe Union need not imply duty-free treatment. On the other hand,
its coverage is much wider than the American program. GSP+ applies to roughly
the same products, but does oﬀer duty-free access. To qualify for GSP+, a country
must formally apply for it; to be accepted, it needs to be considered ‘vulnerable’
and "ratify and eﬀectively implement 27 core international conventions on human
rights, labour rights and other sustainable development and good governance con-
ventions" (European Commission, 2014). As of the end of 2014, 13 countries were
12The value threshold was US$160 million in 2013, with a statutory annual increase of US$5
million. The share threshold is 50% of U.S. imports of the product. This last criterion may be
waived if U.S. imports of the product in the year do not reach a de minimum value (set at US$21.5
million in 2013, with an annual increment of US$0.5 million). This and other possible waivers are
considered on a case-by-case basis, every year (USTR, 2013). AGOA countries (as well as other
LDCs) are not subjected to CNLs.
13Blanchard and Hakobyan (2015) document the potential and the observed discretion exercised
by the U.S. government when deciding eligibility of countries, products and country-product pairs.
As they stress, the system is indeed far from a ‘generalized’ system.
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GSP+ beneﬁciaries. EBA, in place since 2001, oﬀers duty-free access to all LDCs for
all products except arms and ammunitions. Since 2011, its beneﬁciaries also receive
more favorable ROOs. Unlike GSP and GSP+, EBA has no expiry date.
The bottom portion of Table 4 provides details on the breadth and depth of the
main European nonreciprocal programs. A quarter of the European tariﬀ lines are
already zero on an MFN basis. GSP beneﬁciaries receive preferential access in about
87% of the remaining three quarters (a much larger share than in the American GSP),
but in less than half of them preference represents free access (except for GSP+ and
EBA beneﬁciaries, as indicated above). For the European GSP and GSP+ schemes
there is a much sharper distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural products
than in the American ones. In the E.U., almost all non-agricultural goods are eligible
for preferential treatment, but only about half of the dutiable agricultural products
are, and regular GSP beneﬁciaries have duty-free access in just 7% of them.
As the bottom portion of Table 5 shows, of the 40% of dutiable imports entering
the E.U., over half is eligible for preferences under GSP. Exports eligible for prefer-
ences under EBA and GSP+ combined, however, amount to just over 1% of European
imports. That ﬁgure is over 4% if we consider only agricultural products.
Similarly to the U.S., countries ‘graduate’ from the European GSP if they reach a
certain income threshold. This happens frequently. For example, in the 2014 revision
32 countries graduated from GSP. Country-product pairs (and entire sectors) can
graduate as well, if deemed ‘competitive.’ A country-product graduates if it reaches
17.5% of E.U. imports under GSP (14.5% for textiles). This also happens frequently.
For example, on January 2014 several entire sectors from China (especially), India,
Indonesia, Nigeria, Thailand and Ukraine were excluded from the program. Gradua-
tion does not apply to GSP+ countries. EBA beneﬁciaries are excluded only if they
leave the United Nations’ list of LDCs (after a ‘grace period’ of three years).14
14The United Nations’ criteria for graduation from the LDC list depends on the country meeting at
least 2 out of 3 thresholds, based on per capita income, a “human assets index,” and an “economic
vulnerability index.” The United Nations also allows for a 3-year grace period before graduation
takes place (http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/criteria-for-ldcs/).
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The E.U. also has a history of other, non-GSP schemes of nonreciprocal prefer-
ences with developing countries. Those schemes have favored numerous (currently
79) African, Caribbean and Paciﬁc (ACP) countries, usually former colonies of Eu-
ropean countries. This has been changing, however. The system has been challenged
at the WTO and found to be in breach of GATT rules for being discriminatory and
not open to all developing economies. Thus, it infringes Article I without qualifying
for Article XXXVI. The solution has been to turn those arrangements into free trade
areas (FTAs) and invoke Article XXIV. This requires, in turn, that “substantially all
trade” be liberalized. More fundamentally, all parties in the FTAs need to liberal-
ize, turning the arrangements into reciprocal ones, trade-wise. After a 7-year waiver,
interim Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with that purpose were signed in
2007. Transition periods are nevertheless rather long, and even in 2015 only a few of
them were already in force.15
3 Theoretical analyses
Formally, the clauses codifying special and diﬀerential treatment for developing coun-
tries in the GATT/WTO system seek to recognize the speciﬁc needs of developing
countries. It is assumed that greater access to the markets of industrialized economies
will help them grow, but that they need more time and ﬂexibility to liberalize their
own markets. The key issues are therefore whether better access to the markets of
developed economies can indeed help developing countries to grow (or to improve
their economic performance more generally), and whether this can be achieved at the
same time that they keep their own markets closed.
Thus, we start this section by assessing SDT in the context of the prevailing
theories of trade agreements, and then evaluate the channels through which SDT
could enhance economic growth. An indirect way in which SDT, and in particular
nonreciprocal preferences, can aﬀect economic performance is by altering countries’
15See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144912.pdf. Fontagne,
Laborde and Mitaritonna (2010) oﬀer an ex-ante evaluation of the European EPAs.
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(donors and recipients) other trade policies; the last two parts of this section discusses
those channels.
3.1 SDT and the multilateral trading system
Multilateral trade negotiations based on reciprocity and nondiscrimination, as in the
GATT/WTO system, may be interpreted as facilitating eﬃcient outcomes from the
perspectives of governments. Conversely, if either reciprocity or nondiscrimination
are absent, then the resulting equilibrium is generally ineﬃcient (Bagwell and Staiger,
1999; see also chapter 8 of this Handbook). SDT clauses violate both principles.
They allow developing countries to not reciprocate, and through GSP and other
preferential arrangements they infringe nondiscrimination. Furthermore, unlike other
types of trade agreements, arrangements based on SDT provide no ‘commitment
technology’ for politically weak governments facing time-inconsistent problems. For
all those reasons, the presumption of eﬃciency is severely challenged under SDT. We
discuss the consequences of departing from each principle in turn.
3.1.1 Lack of reciprocity
If eﬃciency in multilateral negotiations were sacriﬁced in favor of higher growth rates
in developing economies, SDTmight be justiﬁed. A necessary condition for this higher
growth is that SDT will cause a signiﬁcant boost to the export sectors of developing
countries. The problem is, if a country does not liberalize itself, its import-competing
sectors will remain a strong competitor for domestic resources, limiting the expansion
of its exports.
In fact, as Bagwell and Staiger (2014) elegantly demonstrate, in a multilateral
system that is otherwise based on nondiscrimination and reciprocity, the consequences
for the export sector of bystander countries tend to be even more extreme. Consider
a static 2-good, 3-country competitive model where country 1 imports good x from
the other countries, which in turn import good y from country 1. That is, countries
2 and 3 are “competing exporters” of good x. Each country imposes ad valorem
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tariﬀs on its imported good. This creates a wedge between local and world prices.
Equilibrium world prices equate export supply and import demand for each good.
Given the tariﬀs, local prices are determined. In turn, local and world prices pin
down consumption, production, imports and exports of each good in each country.
All countries are “large” in the sense that their policies aﬀect world prices. As
a result, because the incidence of a tariﬀ is partially borne by foreign exporters,
in the Nash equilibrium tariﬀs are ineﬃciently high and trade volumes ineﬃcient
low. Bagwell and Staiger (1999) show that a trade agreement between the three
countries, following the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination, corrects that
ineﬃciency. Suppose, however, that countries 1 and 2 negotiate according to GATT
rules but country 3 stays out of the negotiations. Because of nondiscrimination,
country 3 would nevertheless enjoy lower tariﬀs in the markets of countries 1 and 2
when they liberalize. As Bagwell and Staiger (2014) demonstrate, however, such a
liberalization by countries 1 and 2 would bring no beneﬁt to country 3.
To see that, observe ﬁrst that, in equilibrium, trade must be balanced in all
countries. In particular, it must be balanced for country 2 both before the agreement
(let subscript N denote all pre-agreement "Nash" variables) and after the agreement
(subscript T denotes all post-trade agreement variables). This can be represented as
M2N = p
w
NE
2
N (2)
and
M2T = p
w
TE
2
T , (3)
where M2j denotes the country 2 equilibrium level of imports of good y, E
2
j denotes
the country 2 equilibrium level of exports of good x, and pwj denotes the equilibrium
relative world price of good x in period j = N, T .16
16Although I do not make it explicit to lighten the notation, observe that pwj is a function of
the tariﬀs in all countries in period j, M2j and E
2
j are functions of p
w
j and of country 2’s relative
local price in period j, and country 2’s relative local price in period j is a function of pwj and of its
tariﬀ in period j. In period N , in addition to equation (2), an analogous trade balance equation
for country 1 and a market-clearing condition in world markets determine the equilibrium of the
economy. Analogous conditions yield the equilibrium of the economy in period T .
18
As the negotiations between countries 1 and 2 follow nondiscrimination, any tariﬀ
reduction they agree on is extended to country 3, which in turn keeps itself out of the
negotiations and thus keeps its own tariﬀ unchanged. Now, as the change in tariﬀs
negotiated by countries 1 and 2 also follow reciprocity, the resulting change in value of
their imports must equal the change in value of their exports evaluated at the initial
world price. For country 2, this can be written as
pwN

E2T − E
2
N

=

M2T −M
2
N

. (4)
Substituting (2) and (3) into (4), we obtain
E2T [p
w
N − p
w
T ] = 0.
The implication is that the world relative price of good x is not altered by the agree-
ment. But notice that, because of nondiscrimination, countries 2 and 3 face exactly
the same world relative price. Since country 3 keeps its tariﬀ constant and faces the
same terms of trade before and after the agreement between countries 1 and 2, its
local relative price does not change either. Therefore, consumption, production, im-
ports and exports–and thus welfare–in country 3 remain at exactly the same level
as they were before the agreement.
Surprising as this result may seem at ﬁrst, it follows directly from nondiscrimi-
nation and reciprocity in trade agreements. Intuitively, the problem for country 3 is
that, although it faces a lower tariﬀ in country 1 after the agreement, it has to com-
pete with the then more “export-oriented” country 2, where resources have ﬂowed
from sector y to sector x. The general message is that the upside for a free rider of
the WTO system is severely limited by the negotiation rules of the system.
Observe that, although reciprocity and nondiscrimination imply no beneﬁts for
free riders, the “glass half-full” interpretation of the consequences of those rules is
that developing countries do not lose either. One might suspect, plausibly, that de-
veloped countries engaged in multilateral liberalization could design their schedule of
tariﬀ concessions to beneﬁt each other at the expense of nonparticipating developing
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countries. However, Bagwell and Staiger (2005a) show that negotiations that follow
reciprocity and nondiscrimination prevent such a bilateral opportunism. Moreover,
those are precisely the rules that allow the engaged countries to fully beneﬁt from
their bargaining. In fact, without one of the two guiding principles negotiations would
stall as each country would fear that the beneﬁt from its current negotiations could
be eroded in the future. In the example above, country 1 could fear that future bar-
gaining between countries 2 and 3 may wear down the value of its current agreement
with country 2, and as a result decide to not negotiate with country 2. However,
using logic similar to the one described above, Bagwell and Staiger (2005a) show that
such fear is prevented if bargaining occurs under reciprocity and nondiscrimination.17
Hence, the problem with the eﬀective lack of participation of developing countries
is largely limited to themselves. Put diﬀerently, the rules of the system are designed in
a way that beneﬁts the countries that actively participate in multilateral negotiations,
but oﬀer nothing–good or bad–to bystanders.18
3.1.2 Lack of nondiscrimination
A diﬀerent issue concerns the departure from nondiscrimination represented by the
preferential treatment oﬀered under GSP and other related arrangements. If one
takes a general equilibrium perspective, and assumes that the receiving countries are
“large,” then one ﬁnds that the departure from MFN distorts the eﬃciency of the
17An implication of this reasoning for the ongoing Doha Round (as well as for future multilateral
rounds of negotiation) is that bringing developing countries to the negotiating table at this stage,
after developed economies have already liberalized their markets considerably, is not a problem for
the multilateral system from a conceptual point of view. Moreover, the system has worked well in
previous similar circumstances, for example when countries like Japan and China joined it. On the
other hand, the scale of the current “latecomers” problem is unprecedented. Bagwell and Staiger
(2014) discuss ways to accommodate this issue under existing negotiating rules.
18As Bown (2009) points out, an additional problem relates to enforcement. With SDT, developing
countries oﬀer little in terms of market access concessions. Thus, when rich countries backtrack on
the commitments that are valuable to developing countries, the latter cannot do much about it, since
there is little that can be taken away. Thus, without (standard market access-based) reciprocity,
the WTO dispute system does not serve developing countries well. As Bown (2009, p. 44) puts,
"foreign market access is only as good as it is enforceable."
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GATT/WTO negotiations and of its ensuing outcomes. Although I am not aware of
any study that makes this point explicitly in the context of nonreciprocal preferences,
such a conclusion follows from the analyses of reciprocal preferences under preferential
trade agreements by Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2005a).
In fact, the existing nonreciprocal preferential arrangements may be especially in-
eﬃcient given that there is not only discrimination between developed and developing
economies, but also across the latter. This possibility is codiﬁed in the GATT in its
distinction between developing countries and LDCs, but in reality discrimination is
signiﬁcant even within each group: as mentioned in section 2.1, donor countries face
very soft constraints when deciding which countries, which products, how much, and
when to oﬀer preferential access, and they often exercise their discretion (Blanchard
and Hakobyan, 2015; Grossman and Sykes, 2005). This discrimination yields a neg-
ative externality for the developing countries that do not qualify for the preferential
treatment. However, the precise nature of the ensued ineﬃciency is a matter that
requires further research, as does the distribution of gains/losses across countries.
An attenuating aspect is that in some markets developing countries may be consid-
ered “small” in the theoretical sense. In that case, oﬀering nonreciprocal preferences
to them, as well as letting them out of multilateral negotiations, would be immaterial
for the eﬃciency of the world trading system. At the same time, their exporters
would receive higher prices due to preferential access to large markets. The main
problem with this viewpoint is that the small country assumption is often unrealistic.
At a more basic level, there are nowadays a number of countries (the “BRICs” being
the most notorious examples) that are individually responsible for relatively large
shares of world trade in several markets. Furthermore, a body of recent empirical
research has formally made the point that most countries do have the ability to aﬀect
their terms of trade on many imported goods (see the discussion Bagwell, Bown and
Staiger, 2016).
Still, at least for LDCs taken individually, the small-country assumption could be
a reasonable approximation. Thus, if they are oﬀered preferential access to foreign
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markets, it means an improvement in their own terms of trade “for free,” akin to
a unilateral transfer. It remains true, however, that although such a gift would be
useful to the recipient country, it may not foster economic growth of the country on
a permanent basis, as the Enabling Clause formally seeks out.
A more benign view of GSP is that it provides a carrot to induce developing
countries to participate in a multilateral trading system based on welfare-improving
nondiscrimination (except for GSP). This is how Saggi and Sengul (2009) suggest
GSP could be interpreted. In a partial-equilibrium context, where ﬁrms compete a la
Cournot in each other’s markets, they model the emergence of the nondiscrimination
rule. Saggi and Sengul (2009) show that nondiscrimination enhances world welfare,
but at the expense of high-cost (‘developing’) countries. In fact, under suﬃciently
high cost asymmetries, developing countries prefer to stay out of the ‘MFN club.’ But
if low-cost (‘developed’) countries oﬀer nonreciprocal preferences to them, as in GSP,
developing countries may decide to ‘join the club’–even though they may prefer a
multilateral system with no MFN rule at all. This logic is consistent with the timing
of accession in the GATT/WTO: most developing countries joined after the Enabling
Clause, and especially after GSP programs became more widespread. It can also help
to justify the existence of GSP in the ﬁrst place.
Another, largely unexplored way of looking at SDT is as a mechanism that al-
lows ﬂexibility relative to MFN. Policy ﬂexibility can be desirable in the presence of
privately observed shocks (Bagwell and Staiger, 2005b) or under contracting costs
(Horn et al., 2010). The most obvious dimension of ﬂexibility obtained through SDT
is for developing countries. As discussed in section 2, SDT disciplines have allowed
developing economies to set their bound tariﬀs at rather high levels. Some of those
countries also have numerous tariﬀ lines that are not bound. Although this may prove
useful in some circumstances, most likely SDT provides an excess of ﬂexibility in the
design of developing countries’ trade policies
But GSP also aﬀords ﬂexibility to advanced economies in the design of their
policies. The clearest type is downward: developing countries can be oﬀered lower-
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than-MFN tariﬀs. Now, the GATT/WTO already provides downward ﬂexibility to
all of its members, since MFN tariﬀs determine only a cap on tariﬀs. One diﬀerence
with GSP is that it allows for downward ﬂexibility together with discrimination. Fur-
thermore, and more subtly, GSP also provides upward ﬂexibility, which is otherwise
not permitted under the GATT/WTO system except in special circumstances. As
discussed in section 2.1, donor countries enjoy signiﬁcant discretion when oﬀering
GSP preferences. They can be taken away from all recipients at the will of the donor
countries; speciﬁc recipient countries (or speciﬁc country-product pairs) can similarly
be taken out from the list of beneﬁciaries. Chapter 8 of the Handbook addresses the
issue of ﬂexibility in trade agreements more thoroughly. Perhaps surprisingly, GSP
has not yet been featured in that context.
3.1.3 Lack of commitment
When the government of a small developing country suﬀers from a commitment prob-
lem, a trade agreement with large countries could play a fundamental role in miti-
gating structural problems of the economy by helping governments solve domestic
time-inconsistency problems (Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 1998, 2007). In the tra-
ditional, liberal way in which developing countries have participated in the GATT
system, such a role was unlikely to be fulﬁlled, as it presumed little/no commitment
to domestic trade liberalization. On the other hand, the more demanding WTO ac-
cession rules since the UR, commanding signiﬁcant liberalization of new members,
constitute a ﬁtting example of a departure from the standard SDT view that could
help to attenuate commitment problems.19
Similarly, as originally envisaged by the Enabling Clause, nonreciprocal arrange-
ments are unlikely to eﬀectively play such a role. Still, as the discussion in section
19In a related fashion, Liu and Ornelas (2014) argue that liberalization in the context of full-
ﬂedged, reciprocal FTAs (but not under shallower, less binding agreements) help countries to stabilize
ﬂedgling democracies. The mechanism operates through a rent-destruction eﬀect, as deﬁned by
Ornelas (2005a), which takes place provided that trade within the FTA is signiﬁcantly liberalized.
This would tie the hands of would-be autocrats and, as a result, discourage a coup d’état.
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2.1 makes clear, the ‘nonreciprocal’ preferences of developed countries often, and in-
creasingly, do require nontrade (and sometimes) noneconomic reciprocity. Possible
beneﬁts depend critically, however, on what those conditionalities are and on the
nature of the ineﬃciency that they may solve.20
3.1.4 SDT and the received literature on trade agreements
Overall, the received theoretical literature on trade agreements, based on either terms
of trade or commitment, oﬀers little support for SDT in its current form. Rather
than beneﬁtting developing countries, the permissiveness with which they have been
treated in the world trading system may have slowed their economies down, by mak-
ing it harder to neutralize ineﬃciencies due to terms-of-trade manipulation and by
weakening the commitment role of trade agreements. From that perspective, one
may even argue that the root of the demise of the Doha Round could be precisely its
“developing” nature, going back to the pre-UR approach to multilateral liberalization.
3.2 SDT and economic growth
One dimension that the standard trade agreements literature does not address is the
possibility of dynamic beneﬁts stemming from better access to foreign markets. It is
conceivable that, even without domestic liberalization, better foreign market access
may improve productivity and boost growth in developing countries. But can SDT
actually help developing countries speed their economic growth, its stated objective?
As Grossman and Helpman (2015) indicate, several mechanisms linking globalization
and economic growth have been identiﬁed, although empirical validation for most of
them is lacking.
20The E.U. recent EPAs, in particular, may be more eﬀective in solving commitment problems re-
lated to domestic market liberalization, as they require the partner developing countries to open up
in exchange for preferential access to the European markets. To the extent that their internal liber-
alization is credible to the relevant economic agents, the EPAs may serve the role of a “commitment
device” for the EPA partners.
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3.2.1 Aggregate productivity and ﬁrm delocation eﬀects
In the context of SDT, one possible mechanism through which better export oppor-
tunities via preferences in the markets of developed economies could lead to (one-oﬀ)
economic growth in developing economies is by increasing aggregate productivity. In
a setting a la Melitz (2003), an increase in exports due to better access to foreign
markets would induce the expansion of the most eﬃcient ﬁrms, thus improving the
allocation of resources in the economy. Such aggregate gains would be accrued at
the expense of purely domestic ﬁrms, which would be hurt as the expanding export-
ing ﬁrms bid local wages up. But if, in the spirit of SDT, the domestic government
implements policies to prevent the decline of purely domestic ﬁrms, they would also
avert the expansion of the exporting ﬁrms, and the better access to foreign markets
would not have its desired eﬀects on the allocation of resources.
In models that display delocation eﬀects, as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)–and
in the context of trade agreements, Ossa (2011)–the rationale for SDT is stronger.
On top of the main mechanism in Melitz (2003), the model of Melitz and Ottaviano
features a “home market eﬀect” where less domestic competition, as well as better
access to foreign markets, induces ﬁrm entry. This is beneﬁcial in itself for the country
in question in the presence of increasing returns to scale and international trade costs
(Ossa, 2011). Furthermore, with ﬁrm heterogeneity as inMelitz and Ottaviano (2008),
more entry also yields higher industry productivity. What the model does not have,
relative to Melitz’s, is a general equilibrium eﬀect reﬂecting the demand for domestic
resources (a competitive sector whose product enters linearly in the consumers’ utility
function absorbs all changes in the demand for domestic labor). Thus, although
increases in aggregate productivity through ﬁrm entry can be an important channel
for economic growth, they would be limited by competition over domestic resources
if purely domestic ﬁrms remain large and protected.
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3.2.2 Foreign market access and dynamic trade gains
Alternatively, SDT may spur economic growth if the sectors that expand as a result
of foreign preferences generate learning spillovers. Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) de-
velop a possible mechanism (although not in the speciﬁc context of SDT). Ex ante,
export opportunities are unknown to domestic ﬁrms. However, they can be gauged
from the experience of export pioneers, who eﬀectively provide a public good to the
rest of the industry. Preferential schemes like GSP may catalyze developing countries’
exports by promoting pioneer ﬁrms which domestic rivals can learn from. Similarly,
Albornoz, Calvo-Pardo, Corcos and Ornelas (2012) propose a simple model of ﬁrm
export dynamics that features ﬁrm-market speciﬁc uncertainty. In that context, a
preference in a foreign market could lead to more export entry in the market oﬀering
the preference and also in other destinations, as ﬁrms learn their own export capabil-
ities and potential. In that sense, foreign preferences may serve as a springboard for
export growth in the beneﬁciary countries.
Likewise, and potentially more importantly, better export opportunities could spur
innovation. The main driving force for innovation would be a scale eﬀect whereby the
larger potential market for the ﬁrm increases the expected return from innovation, as
for example in the models of Lileeva and Treﬂer (2010) and Bustos (2011). Lileeva and
Treﬂer (2010), in particular, emphasize that the complementarity between innovation
and exporting implies that the ﬁrms whose productivity are more likely to increase
with exporting are those that are compelled by new export opportunities to innovate
and to start to export, especially some initially low-productivity ﬁrms.
Observe however that, although all of the mechanisms discussed above are con-
ceivable, they are not speciﬁc to SDT-like contexts (i.e., preferential access to foreign
markets and a protected domestic economy). In the speciﬁc context of nonreciprocal
preferences, there is an older debate on whether the resulting preference rents could be
generated more eﬃciently if the “donor” countries provided aid instead of preferences.
Adam and O’Connell (2004) show in a simple neoclassical setting with a non-traded
good that, absent market imperfections, the two instruments are welfare-equivalent.
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However, due to eﬀects on the terms of trade, the export response of the recipient
country is stronger with tariﬀ preferences than with the equivalent transfer. It fol-
lows that, if there are externalities to exporting, e.g. due to learning-by-doing, then
preferences are superior to aid from an eﬃciency point of view. This line of reasoning
formalizes the original idea behind SDT. The diﬃculty, of course, is in identifying
whether the export industries and products included in existing nonreciprocal pref-
erential schemes are those that display meaningful learning spillovers.
The debate preference vs. aid may also be framed in the context of the endogenous
growth model of Acemoglu and Ventura (2002), although I am not aware of attempts
to do so. Acemoglu and Ventura show that a country that experiences high growth in
a suﬃciently open world eventually faces a reduction of its export prices, which in turn
holds back its growth. Thus, export-led growth in a country sows the seeds for slower
growth in the future due to a terms-of-trade eﬀect, leading to growth convergence
across countries in the long run. In that context, the terms-of-trade boost that stems
from receiving preferences a la GSP could mitigate the negative growth feedback
through terms of trade. In that sense, preferences could yield a superior outcome for
developing countries relative to foreign aid. Investigating this channel in detail could
yield interesting insights on potential dynamic SDT beneﬁts.
3.2.3 The insecurity of preferences
In reality, it is unclear whether SDT, and arrangements of nonreciprocal preferences
in particular, promote the industries that would do the most to foster economic
growth over the long run. It is not impossible that they do. For example, the
export sectors promoted by GSP arrangements could be ‘infant industries’ subject
to positive learning spillovers. However, since product and country eligibilities are
deﬁned by the ‘donor’ countries, there is nothing that suggests that they choose
precisely the products that would generate learning externalities (assuming that they
know which products are in that category). If anything, the opposite may be closer
to real practices. After all, at least in terms of trade ﬂows, the successful product-
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country pairs are the ones that ‘graduate,’ suggesting that the industries that could
leverage GSP-sponsored growth in developing countries may be precisely those whose
preferences tend to be withdrawn.
The insecurity about the preferences also tends to prevent the most basic aim
of the system, namely to promote developing countries’ exports. Assume that the
preferences would boost short-run proﬁts of incipient export sectors, and this would
allow them to invest to obtain future productivity growth. If such sectors are, say,
ﬁnancially constrained, the program could be ﬁxing an important market failure in
developing countries’ export sector. However, if the preferences are uncertain, avert-
ing a clear horizon for proper planning, this investment incentive would be weakened,
implying that export ﬂows may not react as expected. Rather, the explicit (but ﬂex-
ible) criteria for graduation (and to reach a CNL in the American GSP), as well as
the occasional overhauls in nonreciprocal preferential systems (as recently happened
in the European GSP), imply that the GSP beneﬁts may be more similar to aid, in
the sense that they do not induce export expansion beyond a certain level. In such a
case, there would not be any marginal, only inframarginal beneﬁts to the exporting
countries, with no resulting dynamic gains.
To my knowledge no one has studied the impact of uncertain preferences on the
value of GSP, theoretically or empirically. However, Sala, Schroder and Yalcin (2010)
and Handley (2014) develop models to explain how tariﬀ bindings can reduce trade
policy uncertainty and induce ﬁrm export entry from countries serving that market.
Handley and Limao (2015) provide a framework to study trade policy uncertainty
more generally. The main insights from those papers could probably be extended to
study the speciﬁc consequences of the insecurity of GSP preferences.
3.3 GSP and recipients’ trade policies
In addition to asking what the direct eﬀects of GSP (and of other nonreciprocal pref-
erences) are on the exports and on other economic performance measures of recipient
countries, one may ask about their impact on those countries’ trade policies. If re-
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ceiving GSP aﬀects a country’s trade policies, it will impact its welfare indirectly
through that channel.
To explain how a country’s trade policy would be aﬀected by the unilateral poli-
cies of other countries, Krishna and Mitra (2005) rely on a political-economy model
where industries need to incur a ﬁxed cost to organize and become able to lobby.
The key mechanism is as follows. Unilateral liberalization in the foreign country in-
creases the Home country’s export price. This raises the return to Home exporters
from organizing themselves in lobbies to aﬀect Home’s trade policies. Under plausi-
ble conditions, exporters will pay the organization ﬁxed cost and start lobbying for
more liberal trade policies. Thus, through this political-economy channel, unilateral
liberalization abroad (as in GSP) would induce domestic liberalization.21
However, one could look at the Home country’s policy reaction from a diﬀerent
angle. As Ozden and Reinhardt (2005) propose, since GSP does not require liberal-
ization from the recipient country, its export sector may become reluctant to incur
lobbying costs as it already has free access to the foreign country. Moreover, and pos-
sibly more importantly, the export sector anticipates that if its foreign sales increase
too much, the preferences would be withdrawn–the country-sector may ‘graduate’ in
the E.U., or achieve a ‘competitive need’ limit in the U.S. Thus, due to the nature of
GSP, domestic trade liberalization may actually be counterproductive for exporters,
making them unwilling to pressure for it.
Conconi and Perroni (2012, 2015) agree that, without reciprocity, developing coun-
tries may resist liberalization of their own economies and may ultimately not proﬁt
from the SDT concessions, as their export sectors will not be able to expand. However,
they argue that SDT could be interpreted as reciprocal but asynchronous concessions.
This would make sense, helping developing countries achieve a welfare-superior equi-
librium, if their governments suﬀered from a time-consistency problem. In a line
21A related mechanism is developed by Coates and Ludema (2001). They consider the impact of
unilateral trade liberalization on the outcome of trade negotiations when there is a domestic “political
risk” threatening the implementation of the negotiations. In that context, foreign liberalization
lowers the political risk, thus inducing the domestic government to negotiate deeper tariﬀ cuts.
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of reasoning akin to Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare’s (1998), they develop a 2-country
model where the optimal policy for a small country is free trade, but its government
has an incentive to increase protection after investment in the import-competing sec-
tor becomes sunk, for political-economy reasons. Anticipating that, ﬁrms in that
sector over-invest, and as a result the government over-protects. The government
would be better oﬀ, however, if it could commit to free trade. A trade agreement
could be the vehicle for such a commitment.
While this reasoning is well known, the main contribution of Conconi and Perroni
(2015) is in showing that, when investment in the import-competing sector depre-
ciates slowly overtime, the optimal form of such a trade agreement would require
immediate but conditional liberalization by the large country (assumed large enough
to be indiﬀerent to what happens in the small country) in exchange for delayed liber-
alization by the small country. Requiring simultaneous liberalization by the large and
the small economies may not be politically sustainable for the latter–in the sense
that, if imposed, it may be in the interest of the small country government to simply
not liberalize at all. If this is what SDT clauses are about–providing a ‘carrot’ to
developing economies in the form of freer access to the market of rich economies,
together with a ‘stick’ in the form of the removal of such an access if the developing
economy does not liberalize eventually–then they could be serving their purposes
adequately. Conconi and Perroni’s (2015) key point is thus that reciprocity in liber-
alization does not require simultaneity in liberalization, and this may be the intended
purpose of SDT.
This rationale could help to explain why some developing countries choose to enter
in reciprocal preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with developed economies that al-
ready oﬀer signiﬁcant preferences to them under GSP. Recent FTAs between the U.S.
and Central American and Caribbean economies are ﬁtting examples. However, one
may argue that the main goal of those economies when forming the FTA was to secure
the preferences they enjoyed in the American market by removing the uncertainties
of GSP, rather than to provide incentives for their own future liberalization.
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In fact, it is unclear whether what Conconi and Perroni (2015) claim is what SDT
is actually about. For example, although some SDT rules are about ﬂexibility–i.e.,
extended periods–in the adoption of WTO agreements, their interpretation is often
that of a ‘free pass’ for developing countries, not a concession conditional on the future
liberalization of the recipient country. To some extent, GSP concessions are actually
related to the lack of liberalization of the recipient country. The reason is that, if the
developing country eventually opens up its market, this will have a positive impact
on its export sector. But this is precisely what cannot happen, lest the developing
country be ‘graduated’ and lose its preferences. Thus, the actual design of the ‘stick’
component of the policy seems to be at odds with the rationale put forward by
Conconi and Perroni (2015). Furthermore, unlike in their model, where the rich/large
economy is indiﬀerent to the actions of the smaller one, in reality they usually are
not. Since their liberalization under GSP is not legally binding (unlike reciprocal
liberalization under ‘regular’ GATT rules) and can be reversed at their discretion
if their own circumstances change, it may not function as a credible ‘carrot’ either,
thus being ineﬀective in liberating developing countries from their domestic credibility
problems. In sum, if SDT clauses, including GSP, were indeed to become formally
deﬁned to represent asynchronous reciprocity, then they could become a vehicle for
developing economies to overcome institutional time-consistency problems. At the
moment, that does not seem to be the case.
A related but subtler way in which GSP may aﬀect recipients’ trade policies is by
keeping them from violating their WTO commitments. The reason is as follows. The
WTO does not provide for retrospective remedies, only prospective ones. Moreover,
the application of the remedy takes time. First, the trading parties of the breaching
country need to identify the infringement; they then need to prepare a case and
litigate. The litigation itself often takes multiple years. And once a verdict is reached,
the Dispute Settlement Body allows some time for the violator to reform its policies.
Thus, when a member breaches its WTO commitments, it can ‘get away’ with the
violation for a rather long period. The ensuing question is why we do not observe
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more frequent WTO breaches. Wu (2015) is one of the few to tackle this issue.22 He
argues that power asymmetries in an incomplete contract such as theWTO imply that
the most powerful economies, which have an interest in making the system function
well, “exert suﬃcient leverage over smaller and/or weaker states to bring forth their
compliance” (p.99). An important mechanism delivering such leverage is GSP. The
implicit threat is that recurrent breaches could lead to the loss of GSP beneﬁts in
large economies. While Wu’s (2015) hypothesis has not been formally tested (and it
would be diﬃcult to do so), it is compelling. Wu also provides interesting examples
consistent with the threat of GSP suspension serving as a ‘stick’ to prevent developing
countries from breaching their WTO commitments.
Finally, extending a line of reasoning ﬁrst put forward by Richardson (1995),
Crivelli (2015) points out that receiving preferences in a relatively protected market
can induce a small country to either raise or lower its tariﬀ. The preference will
induce the producers from the small country to shift their domestic sales to the more
protected market of its trading partner, where the price is higher. Accordingly, they
will stop lobbying and the political economy motivation for protection will vanish.
Crivelli (2015) adds, however, that a tariﬀ revenue motive could induce the small
country to instead raise its tariﬀs as a result of the preferences received. The reason
is that the deﬂection of domestic production to the foreign market makes tariﬀ revenue
more responsive to tariﬀ changes. If the government of the small economy values $1
in tariﬀ revenue more than $1 in the hands of consumers, increasing tariﬀs to boost
tariﬀ revenue would then be an optimal reaction. Although such a condition may
be unjustiﬁed in developed economies, which typically have more eﬃcient means of
raising ﬁscal revenue, it seems plausible for small, developing countries, which often
lack the capability to raise ﬁscal revenues in less distortionary ways.23
22See chapter 9 of this Handbook for a broader discussion of WTO enforcement and dispute
system.
23Other authors have addressed the revenue-generating role of tariﬀs when studying optimal trade
policies, although not in the context of preferential access to foreign markets. For example, Matschke
(2008) introduces costs to raise ﬁscal revenues into an otherwise standard “protection for sale” model,
which she then estimates; Amador and Bagwell (2012) introduce private shocks to the value of tariﬀ
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3.4 GSP and donors’ trade policies
A diﬀerent but related question regards the eﬀect of GSP (and of other nonreciprocal
preferences) on the incentives of the donor countries to liberalize multilaterally. This
question is closely related to the debate on the complementarity or substitutability
between MFN and preferential tariﬀs.24
A central distinction in that debate is the purpose of the preference. When pref-
erential market access is oﬀered in exchange for reciprocal trade concessions, as in
most FTAs, it induces the involved countries to extend liberalization to countries
not involved in the agreement (see for example Ornelas, 2005a, 2005b). One of the
reasons is to avoid the cost of trade diversion. Another reﬂects the destruction of
rents stemming from the preferential access, which weakens protectionist forces in
the country oﬀering the preferences, thus inducing less protection also vis-à-vis other
countries. In contrast, when preferential market access is oﬀered in exchange for non-
trade concessions, it tends to undermine the incentives of the country oﬀering the
preference to engage in multilateral liberalization (Limao, 2007). The reason is that
the goal of the preference is to oﬀer a volume of rents to the beneﬁciary country high
enough to keep the latter’s incentive to cooperate in nontrade areas. Since lower MFN
tariﬀs would erode the value of the rents and the incentives of the recipient country
to cooperate, the donor country needs to keep the tariﬀ on third parties high enough.
The scenario where developed countries oﬀer preferences in exchange for cooperation
in nontrade (or even non-economic) areas seems to ﬁt the realities of GSP fairly well.
Thus, a prediction of this body of theoretical work is that when nonreciprocal
preferences become reciprocal, we should observe the ‘donor’ country (as well as its
trading partner) also liberalize vis-à-vis other countries. This prediction has not yet
been assessed empirically, but could in principle be tested in the context of the E.U.’s
revenue for governments when studying the optimal design of trade agreements.
24See McCulloch and Pinera (1977) for an early analysis of how a developed economy may want
to alter its MFN tariﬀs when given the possibility to oﬀer preferential access to some of its imports.
For a broader discussion of this topic in the context of FTAs and CUs, see chapter 14 of this
Handbook and the surveys by Freund and Ornelas (2010) and Maggi (2014).
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EPAs.
A diﬀerent mechanism links a country’s trade policy to the activities of its multi-
national ﬁrms (MNFs) abroad. In a 2-country model, Blanchard (2007) shows that
vertical foreign direct investment (FDI) should induce a (large) source country to
lower its tariﬀs. The reasoning is simple: the beggar-thy-neighbor motivation to keep
tariﬀs high is weakened when a fraction of the cost of the tariﬀs shifts from foreigners
to domestic ﬁrms through their multinational activities, which the government inter-
nalizes. Thus, as ﬁrms from rich economies spread their (vertical) activities abroad,
their governments would tend to lower their MFN tariﬀs if they cannot discriminate.
However, if oﬀering preferences is possible–as in the context of GSP–we should
observe not changes in MFN tariﬀs, but instead more generous and more ample GSP
preferences when vertical MNFs expand their activities to developing countries. In
that sense, GSP could be working as a brake on multilateral liberalization driven by
developed economies.
A related line of inquiry evaluates the determinants of whether/when nonrecip-
rocal tariﬀ preferences will be oﬀered–and, when they are, their levels25–in the
context of global value chains (GVCs). Extending the terms-of-trade theory to that
environment, Blanchard et al. (2016) show that protection should decrease in the
domestic value added of foreign ﬁnal goods. The intuition is simple: although pro-
tection can help a country by improving its terms of trade, it does less so when part
of the value added in the imported good is generated in the country. (A similar logic
implies that protection should also decrease in the foreign value added of domestic
ﬁnal goods.) Since MFN tariﬀs are negotiated at the multilateral level, Blanchard et
al. (2016) focus their analysis on bilateral preferential tariﬀs, of which GSP rates con-
stitute a central source of variation. A key prediction is then that, as GVCs expand
to developing countries, GSP preferences should become more generous.
Thus, the few models linking MFN tariﬀs to nonreciprocal (or at least not recipro-
25Recall that, although in the American GSP all preferential tariﬀs are zero, this is not the case
in the European GSP. In most other GSP systems, nonzero preferences are common as well.
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cal in terms of market access) preferences, as in GSP, indicate that those preferences
are likely to reduce the incentives of developed countries to liberalize multilaterally.
However, making the preferences reciprocal–as in a typical free trade agreement–
could have the opposite eﬀect.
4 Empirical evidence on the eﬀects of SDT
4.1 The "SDT trade eﬀect" and other SDT consequences
Evaluating empirically the eﬀects of SDT is challenging, as SDT is present in many
forms and its inﬂuence is spread out over time. However, there are several lines
of research that provide insights on how SDT inﬂuences developing countries’ trade
ﬂows, even though their focus lies elsewhere. There is, in particular, a body of research
that investigates the trade eﬀects of GATT/WTO membership, which delivers results
that are particularly useful for understanding the trade eﬀects of SDT disciplines.
That line of research begun with the inﬂuential, if controversial, contribution of
Rose (2004), who estimates a gravity model of bilateral trade to study how member-
ship in the GATT/WTO aﬀects members’ trade ﬂows, ﬁnding that it does not. In
the debate that followed Rose’s paper, it has become clear that SDT exemptions are
a central factor shaping such lack of a "WTO trade eﬀect." This is observed most
clearly by focusing on WTO eﬀects upon accession. As pointed out above, until the
Uruguay Round membership in the GATT for developing economies came with few
strings attached. This changed during the UR, after which accession started to require
signiﬁcant liberalization from entrants. That change can provide indirect evidence on
what may be termed the "SDT trade eﬀect," which can be inferred by contrasting the
WTO trade eﬀect for developing countries before and after the change in accession
requirements.26
26Naturally, a concern that aﬀects most of this literature, and therefore also my inquiry into the
“SDT trade eﬀect,” is the endogeneity of the accession decision. I bypass that discussion, simply
because the literature has largely bypassed it, too.
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Rose’s (2004) empirical model is very standard. Its basic formulation consists of
an OLS gravity estimation of the form
ln(Tijt) = βd lnDij + βy ln(YiYj)t + γ1Bothinijt + γ2Oneinijt + βxXijt + ǫijt, (5)
where Tijt is average bilateral trade between countries i and j in year t; Dij is the
distance between i and j; Yi and Yj are real GDP for countries i and j; Bothinijt is a
dummy that is unity if i and j are both GATT/WTO members, whereas Oneinijt is
a dummy set to unity if either i or j is a member of GATT/WTO in year t. Xijt is a
vector of controls. His sample covers the period 1950-2000 and includes 175 countries.
After estimating numerous related speciﬁcations, Rose (2004) observes that the WTO
dummies have small and often negative coeﬃcients, and in any case neither is diﬀerent
from zero at conventional signiﬁcance levels. He concludes that membership at the
GATT/WTO has not improved trade among its members.
Several researchers have questioned Rose’s (2004) results in subsequent analy-
ses. One of the main criticisms, which is at the heart of the topic of this chapter,
is the asymmetry between developing and developed economies, as pointed out by
Subramanian and Wei (2007). As discussed in section 2, developing countries have
historically not participated actively in rounds of multilateral liberalization, their
formal membership notwithstanding. As a result, sectors like textile, footwear and
agriculture, where several developing countries possess comparative advantage, have
not been liberalized in developed economies as much as other sectors. In addition, de-
veloping countries have not liberalized their own markets much either. One therefore
should expect the eﬀects of GATT/WTO membership to be much more pronounced
in industrialized economies than in developing ones, and perhaps only present in the
former.
Once Subramanian and Wei (2007) account for that asymmetry, they actually ﬁnd
a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of GATT/WTO membership in promoting trade. Yet
as their title stresses, the eﬀects are "uneven," restricted to industrialized countries
that have been consistently active participants of multilateral trade negotiations, and
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to the sectors over which they negotiate reciprocal concessions.27
In addition, Subramanian and Wei (2007) ﬁnd important diﬀerential eﬀects be-
tween countries that joined the GATT before the UR and those that joined during
or after its conclusion in 1994: whereas GATT/WTO membership does not have any
discernible eﬀect on the import levels of developing countries that joined before the
UR, it has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant impact for those that joined later.
This reﬂects one of the central objectives of the Uruguay Round, namely to reduce
the gap between developed and developing countries in terms of their obligations and
degrees of liberalization, as discussed in section 2.
It is interesting to stress that, in Subramanian andWei’s (2007) analysis, theWTO
trade eﬀect remains insigniﬁcant in the post-WTO period for developing countries
that joined in the early GATT period. In line with the correlations displayed in
tables 2 and 3 in the Appendix, this reveals that SDT provisions remain consequential
for early GATT members, despite the change in accession requirements since the UR.
Overall, the results of Subramanian andWei (2007) indicate that (lack of) SDT seems
critical for the WTO eﬀectiveness in promoting trade–or put diﬀerently, that there
are compelling signs of a negative SDT trade eﬀect.
The eﬀect of ‘removing’ SDT is clearer in the analysis of Tang and Wei (2009).
They show that developing countries acceding to the WTO under the stricter acces-
sion rules experienced higher growth and investment rates in the ﬁve years following
accession. To explain this result Tang and Wei observe that, to have their member-
ship applications approved after the UR, countries had not only to liberalize trade,
but also to implement other market-oriented reforms. Furthermore, and critically, to
generate such eﬀects WTO accession must be believed by economic actors to confer a
permanent character to those reforms. In other words, using the rationale put forward
by Maggi and Rodrigues-Clare (1998, 2007), Tang and Wei (2009) argue that WTO
27Eicher and Henn (2011) argue that the industrialized-country WTO eﬀect obtained by Subra-
manian and Wei (2007) actually reﬂects the eﬀect of PTAs among those countries. Nevertheless,
Eicher and Henn also ﬁnd that there are positive WTO eﬀects for the countries that have more
to gain from trade negotiations (as proxied by their import volumes at accession), in line with the
predictions of the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements.
37
accession after the UR has a commitment value strong enough to have a positive
growth impact. Indeed, they ﬁnd that the eﬀects are particularly large in countries
with weak governance, where external policy commitments have a bigger role to play.
Liu and Ornelas (2014) seek to understand how the formation of FTAs aﬀects the
survival of democracy in the member countries through the destruction of protec-
tionist rents. They argue that the lagged FTA import share is an eﬀective proxy for
the rent destruction eﬀect engendered by those agreements. Liu and Ornelas distin-
guish, however, between agreements ratiﬁed under GATT’s Article XXIV and those
notiﬁed to the WTO under the Enabling Clause. Developed countries must notify
their FTAs to the WTO under Article XXIV. However, trading blocs formed only by
developing economies have the choice to notify either under Article XXIV or under
the Enabling Clause. As indicated in footnote 7, the Enabling Clause imposes almost
no constraints on what bloc members must accomplish. As a result, implementation
rates are usually signiﬁcantly higher for agreements ratiﬁed under Article XXIV than
for those based on the Enabling Clause.
Interestingly, Liu and Ornelas (2014) ﬁnd that while the coeﬃcient of the lagged
FTA import share is positive and statistically signiﬁcant for those ratiﬁed under
Article XXIV, the coeﬃcient of the FTA import share is always statistically indis-
tinguishable from zero for Enabling Clause-based FTAs. This indicates that unlike
the full-ﬂedged FTAs, partial, incomplete processes of preferential trade liberaliza-
tion have no meaningful eﬀect on the destruction of protectionist rents (and thus on
democracy survival). More generally, the results of Liu and Ornelas (2014) provide
additional support to the view that commitments in trade agreements are valuable,
but that SDT-based trade agreements do not fulﬁll that role eﬀectively.
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4.2 The trade eﬀects of nonreciprocal preferences
4.2.1 Aggregate trade ﬂows
The empirical literature on the WTO trade eﬀects has always included "controls" for
GSP status. As a result, that line of inquiry has created an “incidental literature”
that fosters understanding of SDT by helping us to infer the eﬀectiveness of GSP in
promoting trade.
Rose (2004) simply introduces in equation (5) a dummy indicating whether coun-
try i is a GSP beneﬁciary of country j or vice versa in year t in the vector of controls
Xijt. He estimates that providing GSP status raises trade by over 100 percent.28 But
starting from Rose’s baseline equation, estimation procedure and sample classiﬁca-
tion, there have been numerous advances on how to better identify WTO, and thus
GSP, trade eﬀects, in addition to the split between types of economies mentioned in
section 4.1.
First, the subsequent literature (with the exception of Chang and Lee, 2011)
replaces Rose’s dependent variable with the more appropriate log-value of the im-
ports of country i from country j in year t. Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers (2007)
also argue that Rose’s de jure deﬁnition of GATT/WTO membership is inaccurate,
mistakenly classifying a subset of countries as nonparticipants. In particular, they
argue that colonies, provisional and other de facto members should be codiﬁed as
GATT/WTO members. Subramanian and Wei (2007) point out that Rose does not
control for “multilateral resistance,” as pointed out by Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003), and include time-varying importer and exporter ﬁxed eﬀects for that purpose.
Liu (2009), observing that the typical log-linear gravity approach suﬀers from het-
eroskedasticity and non-normality of residuals in bilateral trade ﬂows, employs the
Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator developed by Santos-Silva
and Tenreyro (2006) to address those problems. More fundamentally, Liu emphasizes
the distinction between intensive and extensive margins: as the standard approach
28Rose (2004) uses that estimate to emphasize that his empirical speciﬁcation has the power to
yield statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of trade agreements.
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restricts the analysis to country pairs for which positive trade is observed–the in-
tensive margin–it ignores extensive margin eﬀects, a channel through which he ﬁnds
that the GATT/WTO membership has had a particularly strong eﬀect. Eicher and
Henn (2011) introduce country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects to better control for unobserved het-
erogeneity, extend the coverage of PTAs and allow for diﬀerences in trade eﬀects
across PTA partners. Chang and Lee (2011) claim that the econometric speciﬁcation
employed by Rose and others is inadequate, proposing non-parametric methods to
correct potential misspeciﬁcation biases in the conventional approach and to allow a
more general treatment of heterogeneous eﬀects.
Another source of diﬀerence across studies is the coding of trade agreement (WTO,
PTA and GSP) dummies. Rose (2004) follows the most straightforward approach of
assigning 1s whenever a trade agreement relationship is observed. However, Subra-
manian and Wei (2007) observe that, if a pair of countries belongs to a common PTA,
their WTO and GSP relationships become redundant. The observation is based on
the presumption that the WTO, GSP and PTAs encompass increasing degrees of lib-
eralization. In that case, if one setsWTO = GSP = 1 the WTO and GSP eﬀects are
downplayed. Instead, in order to only capture the ‘net eﬀects,’ Subramanian and Wei
classify ‘no agreement,’ GSP, WTO and PTA as mutually exclusive states. They also
make the central distinction between countries that grant and receive GSP, assigning
the GSP indicator to zero when an industrial country is exporting to a developing
country, since GSP is always granted by an industrialized country to a developing
one, not the reverse.
Most of the analyses inspired by Rose’s (2004) approach yield positive WTO
eﬀects of some sort, although estimates can vary greatly from one study to another.
Like the WTO eﬀect, the trade eﬀect of GSP also hinges on sample selection, coding
deﬁnitions, econometric speciﬁcation and method of estimation.
The positive, large and signiﬁcant eﬀect of GSP obtained by Rose (2004) is roughly
preserved in the analyses of Tomz et al. (2007) and Chang and Lee (2011). The
ﬁndings of Subramanian and Wei (2007) are subtler. In most speciﬁcations, they
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ﬁnd that GSP promotes aggregate imports. However, when disaggregating by (ﬁve)
sectors, the GSP coeﬃcient becomes unstable. In fact, in some sectors where little
liberalization has occurred, the eﬀect becomes strongly negative. Those heterogeneous
eﬀects may reﬂect donors’ discretion in the design of their own GSP system. Similarly,
Liu’s (2009) estimates for the GSP trade eﬀect are statistically signiﬁcant and very
high when he relies on a log-linear speciﬁcation. However, when Liu adopts PPML
the GSP coeﬃcient becomes unstable, depending on whether zero trade ﬂows and
country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects are included. Herz and Wagner (2011) also employ a Poisson
maximum likelihood estimator. They evaluate the eﬀects of GSP on aggregate trade
ﬂows, distinguishing short- from long-run eﬀects, and ﬁnd that although GSP may
boost short-run exports, it decreases long-run exports from developing countries.
More critically, in Eicher and Henn’s (2011) analysis the GSP eﬀect is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant in most speciﬁcations. It is diﬃcult to pin down what explains
this entirely diﬀerent (and unintuitive) result. A candidate could be Eicher and Henn’s
coding of GSP only since 1980, missing the preferences oﬀered in the 1970s.
Gil-Pareja, Llorca-Vivero and Martínez-Serrano (2014) study GSP together with
other nonreciprocal arrangements permitted under SDT. The distinction is potentially
important, as there is heterogeneity across GSP beneﬁciaries. In particular, countries
in arrangements like AGOA and EBA are “more preferred” than other developing
countries. Gil-Pareja et al. (2014) also extend coverage to 2008. As Eicher and Henn
(2011), they include time-varying importer, time-varying exporter and country-pair
ﬁxed eﬀects. They use both PPML and a speciﬁcation a la Helpman et al. (2008)
to control for selection at the extensive margin. When bundling all GSP and non-
reciprocal schemes together, the results are unequivocally positive and strong. When
disaggregating by program, Gil-Pareja et al. ﬁnd that not all arrangements positively
aﬀect exports from beneﬁciaries. For example, the eﬀects of the Andean Trade Pref-
erence Act29 and (depending on the speciﬁcation) CBI are negative and statistically
29ATPA was an American program of nonreciprocal preferences oﬀered to Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador and Peru in exchange to eﬀorts from those countries in combating drug production and
traﬃcking. It was enacted in 1991 and expanded in 2002, when it was renamed the Andean
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signiﬁcant. There is no statistically discernible eﬀect for Australia’s, Japan’s and
New Zealand’s GSP arrangements. On the other hand, AGOA, EBA, ACP and GSP
from other developed economies have a clear positive eﬀect on beneﬁciaries’ exports.
Overall, the literature on the aggregate trade eﬀect of GSP and other nonrecip-
rocal preferences points to a (probably) positive but unstable eﬀect, and is not con-
clusive. First, the magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance of the positive eﬀect varies
widely across (and sometimes within) studies. Furthermore, the contrasting ﬁndings
of Eicher and Henn (2011), and of other studies when disaggregating by sector or by
program of preference, call for further research to determine the factors behind the
sensitivity of the estimates, and to determine whether we can be conﬁdent about a
positive “GSP eﬀect.”
Now, even if future research convincingly establishes those points, an important
limitation inherent in this literature is the very high level of aggregation of the analy-
ses. The aggregation matters, as usually not all products qualify for preferential
treatment. Similarly, GSP and other nonreciprocal preference schemes diﬀer in terms
of the product coverage, depth of tariﬀ cuts, safeguards and rules of origin. As a
result, taking GSP as a dichotomous variable in aggregate trade data can mask sub-
tle heterogeneous eﬀects–and may help to explain the instability of the coeﬃcient
of the GSP dummy across studies. Furthermore, the identiﬁcation strategy in those
analyses makes it diﬃcult to infer the causal eﬀect of GSP status on trade ﬂows.
4.2.2 Disaggregated trade ﬂows
Some of the analyses discussed above identify the trade eﬀects of unilateral preferences
mostly from cross-section variations. Moreover, they focus on aggregate trade ﬂows,
with only occasional but minor concerns about heterogeneity. This raises concerns of
whether the estimated coeﬃcients actually reﬂect the causal eﬀects of the preferences.
Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA). It expired in 2013, after Colombia
and Peru implemented FTAs with the U.S. and Bolivia and Ecuador were declared ineligible
(http://web.ita.doc.gov/tacgi/eamain.nsf/6e1600e39721316c852570ab0056f719/53018ab5e2d8426a8
52573940049684c).
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Surprisingly, there are very few studies that concentrate on disaggregated within
variation. But there are notable exceptions.
Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) are to my knowledge the ﬁrst to fully exploit
time-varying status of nonreciprocal preference schemes to evaluate their trade im-
pact. Using data from 1988 to 2006, they study AGOA, which came into force in
2001. The analysis is at the country-product-year level. AGOA status and tariﬀs are
deﬁned at the HS 8-digit, but to avoid an exceedingly high number of zero entries,
Frazer and Van Biesebroeck keep the analysis at the HS 6-digit level, using weighted
averages for aggregation. The dependent variable is either log(exports)30 or a dummy
for strictly positive exports to the U.S. The main estimates have country-product,
country-year and product-year ﬁxed eﬀects, with the key independent variable being
the triple interaction of dummies for country eligibility, product eligibility and the
years since 2001, when AGOA was implemented.
For non-apparel products, Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) ﬁnd that AGOA led
to an increase of almost 13% in export volumes of the aﬀected country-product pairs.
Moreover, they obtain an eﬀect 3 to 4 times larger for apparel. This probably reﬂects
two factors. One is the lower competition from other countries due to the widespread
use of quotas until the end of 2004. The other is the provision exempting the poorest
AGOA countries from rules of origin requirements, as mentioned in footnote 11. They
also ﬁnd that an AGOA preference increases in 1 percentage point the probability that
a country-product will be exported, a very large eﬀect relative to the unconstrained
probability of 1.6% that a product is exported to the U.S. under AGOA. When
disaggregating the estimates by year, Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) observe
that the AGOA eﬀects increase over time, possibly reﬂecting some sort of learning,
or of capacity/capabilities building. It could also reﬂect adjustment costs related
to the ﬂow of resources to the expanding sectors and away from the rest of the
economy. Furthermore, the eﬀects are larger for products whose MFN tariﬀs are
30When there is zero or no registered trade ﬂow, Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) add US$1 to
the entry, so it becomes log(1) and is kept in the sample.
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higher. Interestingly, there is no sign of trade deﬂection, as measured by lower exports
to the E.U. In fact, exports of manufactured (non-apparel) products to the E.U.
increased, implying a positive third-market eﬀect that could possibly reﬂect higher
productivity in the expanding industries.31
Although AGOA was implemented in 2001, its beneﬁciaries were already GSP
recipients. As discussed in section 2.1.1, AGOA preferences are broader and more
secure than the standard American GSP preferences. This is why Frazer and Van
Biesebroeck (2010) are able to identify eﬀects stemming from AGOA. But since they
include in their sample non-AGOA but GSP-eligible countries and products, as well
as GSP-ineligible countries and products, their ﬁndings are a mix of the gains from
receiving AGOA preferences relative to regular GSP preferences in GSP-eligible prod-
ucts, and the gains from receiving AGOA preferences relative to no preferences in
GSP-ineligible products. If we presume that the trade eﬀects of regular GSP are
positive, the eﬀects of AGOA on beneﬁciaries’ exports, relative to what they would
export under MFN, would actually be larger than the ﬁgures that Frazer and Van
Biesebroeck (2010) report. It would be interesting to make that empirical distinction,
identifying separately the eﬀects of GSP to which AGOA adds.
More recently, Thelle, Jeppesen, Gjødesen-Lund and Van Biesebroeck (2015)
adopt the same methodology of Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) to analyze the
eﬀects of the nonreciprocal arrangements of the E.U., where they do make the dis-
tinction between diﬀerent nonreciprocal arrangements. Identiﬁcation comes from the
introduction of EBA in 2001 and from changes in the E.U. GSP throughout the pe-
riod. Focusing on imports of the ﬁrst 15 members of the E.U. from 1995 to 2012,
they use detailed trade and tariﬀ information for products at the HS 6-digit level.
Since E.U. preferential tariﬀs are not necessarily zero, and vary across products and
countries of origin, it is possible to assess the eﬀects of the size of the preferential
margins on exports of developing countries. Thelle et al. (2015) ﬁnd that GSP pref-
31Such a positive third-market eﬀect is in line with the ﬁndings of Defever and Ornelas (2015)
for Chinese exports of textiles and clothing products after the end of the Multiﬁber Arrangement in
2005.
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erences boost the exports of the covered products by almost 5% on average. However,
the impact is twice as big for LDCs. In line with that result, the authors ﬁnd that
the average impact of EBA is about 75% larger than the impact of regular GSP or
GSP+. The authors speculate, sensibly, that the diﬀerential eﬀect may reﬂect the
more permanent nature of EBA. Interestingly, the positive eﬀects are present even for
products where the MFN tariﬀ is very low, suggesting that compliance with ROOs
has not been a central problem in the E.U. nonreciprocal arrangements.32 Thelle et
al. (2015) also look at the extensive margin eﬀects. They ﬁnd that being covered by
GSP increases the likelihood that a given product will be exported to the E.U. by a
developing country, but the eﬀect is on average very small. However, for LDCs (cov-
ered by EBA) the probability of exporting increases by 25%. Interestingly, the eﬀects
are larger for some types of manufactured products, rather than for commodities.33
Hakobyan (2013) follows a very similar approach when exploiting GSP expiration
in the U.S. during ten months in 2011 to identify the trade eﬀects of GSP. As in
the study of Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010), preferences and tariﬀs are deﬁned
at the HS 8-digit but the analysis is at the HS 6-digit level, using weighted averages
for aggregation.34 The main speciﬁcation is entirely analogous to Frazer and Van
Biesebroeck’s (2010), with the key independent variable being the triple interaction
of dummies for country GSP eligibility, product GSP eligibility and 2011, the year
where the GSP program expired and was not immediately renewed by Congress. The
GSP eligibility dummy does not include the countries that are eligible for duty-free
access through other programs, such as AGOA and ATPA, since those programs were
32In fact, the results of Thelle et al. (2015) indicate that exports are stimulated by more for
products with lower MFN. This merits further scrutiny. Two possibilities are aggregation problems
(their analysis is at the 6-digit level, although tariﬀs are deﬁned at the 10-digit level) and the
structure of MFN tariﬀs in the E.U., which may be negatively related to the price elasticity of the
product. In a detailed analysis, which includes but is not restricted to GSP, Keck and Lendle (2012)
do ﬁnd, in any case, evidence of high utilization rates of preferences for the E.U. (and three other
countries) even for very low preferential margins.
33Also for the extensive margin eﬀects, eﬀects are larger for products with lower MFN rates.
34Hakobyan (2013) presents a few results at the HS 8-digit level, which are roughly equivalent to
her 6-digit estimations.
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maintained throughout 2011. The analysis uses data from 2010 to 2012.
Hakobyan (2013) ﬁnds that the suspension caused a reduction of almost 3% in
export volumes of the aﬀected country-product pairs. This ﬁgure comes from an
estimation that uses a balanced panel, including all nil export ﬂows.35 If she considers
only the country-product pairs that are strictly positive in at least one year of the
sample, the estimated reduction jumps to 18%. The extensive margin eﬀect is also
statistically signiﬁcant but relatively small (a 0.3 percentage point reduction, relative
to a 7.9 percentage point that a product-country pair ﬂow will be strictly positive).
The eﬀects are larger for products whose MFN tariﬀs are higher, indicating that the
size of the preferential margin matters in the American GSP as one would expect.
There is no sign of ‘export diversion,’ as measured by higher exports to the E.U.,
where GSP did not expire.
As mentioned in section 2.1.1, there have been other cases of American GSP ex-
pirations in the past. Invariably, when the program was renewed, duties paid were
refunded to the exporters. Thus, the identiﬁed negative eﬀects point towards some
sort of credit constraints. Since the suspension aﬀects only developing economies,
this explanation is sensible, especially in light of recent analyses demonstrating the
importance of credit constraints for exporters.36 This possible explanation is rein-
forced by the ﬁnding that the eﬀects are larger for the smaller (product-country)
exporters. Thus, the analysis of Hakobyan (2013) points toward a neglected but ap-
parently critical beneﬁt of nonreciprocal preferences to developing countries, namely
the removal/weakening of constraints to the growth of their existing export industries.
A diﬀerent issue is the varying degrees of preferences across programs from a single
donor country. This raises at least two concerns. First, about the WTO legality of
discrimination across developing countries, as Grossman and Sykes (2005) discuss at
length. Second, about trade diversion within the program. Borchert (2009) analyzes
the latter for the European system, contrasting in particular the ACP preferences
35As Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010), Hakobyan (2013) adds US$1 to the zero entries, so they
become log(1) and are kept in the sample.
36See for example Manova (2013) and Paravisini, Rappoport, Schnabl and Wolfenzon (2014).
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relative to “regular” GSP. His analysis is at the HS 6-digit level for the period 1996-
2001, and his dependent variable is imports into the E.U. relative to imports into the
U.S., which treated the two groups of countries similarly during the sample period.37
Borchert (2009) ﬁnds evidence of nontrivial trade diversion across developing countries
in manufacturing (although not in agriculture), from regular GSP beneﬁciaries to
ACP members. His ﬁndings contrast with the lack of export diversion observed by
Hakobyan (2013) and with the positive export diversion/third-market eﬀect obtained
by Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) across destination markets.
Now, one factor that may prevent GSP from achieving its stated goals in the
U.S. is the existence of Competitive Needs Limits. Again, evidence is scant for the
eﬀects of CNL exclusion, both for those who lose the preferential treatment and
for others. Nevertheless, Hakobyan (2014) provides such an analysis. She studies
202 cases of CNL exclusions between 1997 and 2009. The analysis is at the HS
8-digit level. The main empirical speciﬁcation is an OLS estimation at the product-
country level of either U.S. import values or U.S. import shares on separate dummies
for CNL exclusion in the year of exclusion and in the three subsequent years, with
year and exporter country ﬁxed eﬀects, in addition to usual controls. Hakobyan
(2014) documents a signiﬁcant drop in the exports of the aﬀected country-product
pairs, in the year of exclusion and even more in the subsequent years, resulting in
a collapse of U.S. imports after three years to an average of one fourth of the value
just before exclusion. Again, the eﬀects are larger, the higher the MFN tariﬀ. Most
of the ‘lost’ sales are replaced by non-GSP recipients, contrarily to the formal goals
of CNLs. When Hakobyan applies a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach using other
dutiable products imported from the aﬀected countries as well as other exporters of
the products aﬀected as control groups, she obtains smaller but still economically and
statistically important eﬀects.
An interesting regularity is that, in 86% of the exclusion cases, the threshold that
37For “regular” GSP beneﬁciaries, Borchert (2009) considers only seven relative large developing
countries, including Brazil, China and India.
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triggered exclusion was the share, not the value imported. Moreover, in three-quarters
of the former the country-products excluded were eligible to a waiver (but did not
receive one) due to the low value of imports. Hakobyan (2014) shows that the negative
eﬀects of the exclusion are observed only when the CNL share threshold is reached.
For the country-product pairs with large exported volumes, exclusion from GSP has
no statistically identiﬁable eﬀect. Those results suggest that the CNL criteria could
be excluding from the American GSP program not the "most competitive" exporters,
as it claims to do, but mainly those that depend heavily on the preferences to prosper.
This raises the question of whether the American GSP program has been dropping
countries and products exactly in the circumstances when the program is having an
impact.
Another unanswered question is whether–and if so, to what extent–exporting
ﬁrms switched to other, similar but preference-receiving, products. If such a switch
was prevalent, then the welfare impact of the CNL limits would be signiﬁcantly lower
than the drastic drop of exports suggests. However, if that happened the coeﬃcient
in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation would tend to be larger than the coeﬃcient
in the OLS estimation, not smaller. Nevertheless, this is relatively diﬃcult to pin
down without ﬁrm-level export data.
Overall, the results from the studies focusing on “within variation” oﬀer more
consistent ﬁndings between them than the analyses of aggregate trade ﬂows. They
show that nonreciprocal preferences can have a meaningful impact on developing
countries’ exports, presumably by mitigating constraints to their growth, and possibly
leading to productivity growth.
Still, to really understand the nature of the operating forces and mechanisms,
one needs ﬁrm-level analyses. Given that such studies have become pervasive in
the broader international trade literature, their virtual absence in the SDT/GSP
literature is rather puzzling–if not for LDCs, for which availability of reliable ﬁrm-
level data is rather limited, at least for non-LDC developing countries. The only
exception appears to be the ongoing study of Albornoz et al. (2016), who exploit the
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permanent suspension of American GSP beneﬁts for several (but not all) products
imported from Argentina in 1997 due to an infringement of intellectual property
rights (in areas unrelated to those where the preferences were halted). Their results
indicate that the suspension had a sizeable negative impact on the exporters of the
aﬀected products, harming them at both the intensive and the extensive margins.
Furthermore, when exploring the multi-product dimension of the exporting ﬁrms,
Albornoz et al. reveal that ﬁrms’ reactions also involve substitution of products, with
the precise nature of the substation varying across ﬁrm characteristics such us size,
export experience and number of exported products. Nevertheless, further research
exploring similar policy shocks in other countries and periods is needed to assess more
generally how ﬁrms react to preferences that vary across products.
4.2.3 Utilization rates and preference uncertainty
Naturally, preferences can promote exports only if ﬁrms use them. From the per-
spective of an exporter, the gain from utilizing a preference can be proxied by the
product between its exported volume and the preferential margin. In turn, the cost
from utilizing a preference is related to the stringency of ROOs. Since compliance
with ROOs requires administrative costs, part of which have a ﬁxed cost nature (e.g.,
setting up a compliance system and hiring workers to operate it), ﬁrms will choose to
use their preferences only if they expected to use them enough to compensate for the
ﬁxed costs. All else equal, this is more likely to happen if the ﬁrm sells large volumes
and if the preference is expected to stay in place for a suﬃciently long period. A
similar trade oﬀ arises when a ﬁrm considers whether to alter its sourcing decisions to
comply with ROOs, since input sourcing often involves customization, which in turn
requires long-term commitments to be attractive. A ﬁrm will incur such switching
costs only if it expects to export relatively large volumes for a reasonable period of
time to the preference-giving country.
Hakobyan (2015) oﬀers the clearest account of the factors aﬀecting GSP utilization
rates. Evaluating exports from 68 countries to the U.S. from 1997 to 2008 under
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GSP, she notes that the producers of about 40% of GSP-eligible American imports
do not claim the GSP beneﬁts. Part of the reason is that some producers have
access to more generous ROOs schemes, such as AGOA. Still, there is signiﬁcant
underutilization of preferences. Employing a variety of speciﬁcations, Hakobyan ﬁnds
that utilization increases with the preferential margin and with the volume of exports,
both of which raise the beneﬁts of the preference. In turn, utilization decreases with
the degree of processing of the product, in line with the presumption that a signiﬁcant
share of value added is imported for products with a high degree of processing, and
that distorting the sourcing strategy in such cases to enjoy preferential tariﬀs is not
worthwhile. While this result is not surprising, it contrasts with the formal goal of the
Enabling Clause, of promoting new, dynamic industries in developing countries. The
results from Hakobyan (2015) indicate instead that the ﬁrms that can comply with
ROOs and beneﬁt from preferential access in the markets of developed economies are
mostly the producers of primary and other simple products. Moreover, as global value
chains increase in importance worldwide, the set of products that makes it worthwhile
complying with ROOs tend to shrink overtime.
A related issue is the insecurity of nonreciprocal preferences. Postigo (2014) of-
fers suggestive evidence that the underutilization of GSP could be a sign of that
insecurity. Studying the decision of Japan and Thailand to form an FTA, Postigo
documents intense lobbying for the agreement by ﬁrms located in Thailand that had
GSP treatment in Japan, including Thai subsidiaries of Japanese ﬁrms. After the
implementation of the FTA, Postigo observes that the GSP utilization rate in those
sectors drops sharply at the same time that the FTA utilization rate rises. Thus, he
posits that ﬁrms spent resources lobbying for an FTA that would not change the pref-
erential tariﬀ levels they faced, but which would presumably decrease the insecurity
of the preferences.
Postigo’s (2014) observations are also in line with the ﬁndings of Manger and
Shadlen (2014). Relying on the plausible assumption that countries for which a
greater share of exports enjoy GSP preferences are more exposed to GSP uncertainty,
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Manger and Shadlen test whether those countries are more likely to seek and form
FTAs with the E.U. and U.S., as the preferences should become more stable with
an FTA than under GSP. Using data from 1990 to 2010, they deﬁne the share of
exports entering those markets under GSP as their key measure of “political trade
dependence.” Manger and Shadlen (2014) ﬁnd that the lagged GSP-based exports
share is indeed a strong predictor of future FTAs with the E.U. and/or the U.S.
While it is possible to think of factors that could aﬀect both the share of GSP-
based export and the likelihood of FTA formation (e.g., political alignment with the
major economies), the results of Manger and Shadlen (2014) are consistent with the
hypothesis of preference uncertainty breeding FTAs, a topic that is certainly worth
further research.
Employing a structural approach, Handley and Limao (2015) evaluate the gains
from reducing trade policy uncertainty stemming from Portugal’s accession to the
European Community in 1986. Even though that policy change is not directly linked
to SDT, it informs that literature by emphasizing the value of reducing the uncertainty
of preferential treatment. In fact, Portugal’s accession entailed little change in the
levels of trade barriers–since as a member of the European Free Trade Association
Portugal already had virtually free access to the European market. Still, Handley and
Limao estimate a large impact on export entry rates and sales of Portuguese ﬁrms
due to the accession, which can be linked to reduction of trade policy uncertainty.
A related line of research studies how the policy uncertainty due to large tariﬀ
overhangs can prevent foreign ﬁrm export entry. Groppo and Piermartini (2014),
studying the bindings of all WTO members from 1996 to 2011, show that they in-
deed matter for the level and the variability of applied rates: bindings reduce the
probability of increases and raise the probability of decreases in applied rates, even
when there is “water” in the tariﬀ. The eﬀects are weakened when the level of the wa-
ter rises. In turn, Handley (2014) provides evidence that large tariﬀ overhangs limit
the entry of foreign exporters. He does so using Australian data, where trade pol-
icy uncertainty increased after applied tariﬀs fell signiﬁcantly during the later 1980s
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and 1990s, without corresponding changes in the bound rates. Since nonreciprocal
preferences produce similar trade policy uncertainty, it is plausible that they yield
eﬀects analogous to those of tariﬀ overhangs. To date there has not been, however,
any study that explicitly estimates those eﬀects.
4.3 The impact of greater export opportunities
As pointed out at the outset, the formal goal of SDT is to promote export-led growth.
If developing countries acquire better access to large markets, scale economies could
spur productivity and lead to economic growth. Although theoretically plausible,
identifying such a mechanism empirically is a tall order. One of the main diﬃculties
is that policies that increase export opportunities are usually implemented together
with many other economic changes, making isolating the eﬀects a challenge. In par-
ticular, most of the circumstances when foreign markets become more accessible to
domestic producers are observed in the context of trade agreements, when the country
also opens up to foreign producers, in contrast with the SDT/GSP context. Moreover,
those policies are often endogenous to the question in analysis. As a result, reliable
estimations of the eﬀects of increased market access on growth (and on related mea-
sures) remain relatively rare.
Although diﬃcult, there is a set of papers that uncover “learning-by-exporting”
eﬀects. Van Biesebroeck (2005) is the ﬁrst to provide evidence for productivity im-
provements following export market entry in ﬁrms from eight sub-Saharan African
countries. Employing a matching estimator to construct a benchmark from which to
properly measure the performance of exporters, De Loecker (2007) also ﬁnds learning-
by-exporting eﬀects for Slovenia for the period when the country joined the E.U., soon
after its transition out of a planned economy. The eﬀects are larger for ﬁrms selling
to more developed countries, in line with a mechanism where sellers learn from their
interaction with more sophisticated buyers.
One of the main challenges in identifying productivity gains from exporting is in
disentangling them from price eﬀects (De Loecker, 2011). If more productive ﬁrms
52
charge lower prices per unit of quality, as many theoretical models would suggest, then
productivity measures based on ﬁrm revenue, as in most empirical analyses, will mix
the two eﬀects and underestimate productivity gains from exporting. An alternative
is to use data on physical quantities, but their availability is scarce. Garcia-Marin and
Voigtländer (2014) are able to ﬁlter out those measurement problems. Computing
plant-product level marginal cost for Chilean manufacturing plants, they ﬁnd strong
learning-by-exporting eﬀects, especially (but not only) for export entrants.
A possible reason why ﬁrm productivity may increase upon exporting is that
enhanced market access can alter ﬁrms’ incentives to innovate. There are few but
remarkable eﬀorts attempting to identify such a channel. Lileeva and Treﬂer (2010)
do so for Canada following the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement of 1988 (CUSTA)
by constructing a plant-speciﬁc tariﬀ cut instrument, based on plant production and
bilateral tariﬀ changes data. That data allow them to estimate a heterogeneous re-
sponse model, where the underlying assumptions are that ﬁrms are heterogeneous in
productivity and in their return from investing. Lileeva and Treﬂer (2010) ﬁnd that
better access to the American market encouraged innovation in Canadian ﬁrms by
expanding the eﬀectively available market for Canadian ﬁrms, but only for some of
them. Furthermore, they ﬁnd that, among the ﬁrms that started to export as a re-
sult of CUSTA, the innovation response was higher for initially less productive plants.
This result underscores the complementarity between innovation and exporting: ﬁrms
that did not export prior to CUSTA decided to innovate because of the new export
opportunity, and decided to export because they could do so with a higher produc-
tivity. Bustos (2011) ﬁnds, similarly, that Argentinean ﬁrms increased innovation as
a result of better access to Brazil’s market following the formation of MERCOSUR.
Now, even if better access to the market of developed economies does not have
clear eﬀects on the growth of developing countries, it can have other similarly worthy
beneﬁts. Again, proper identiﬁcation of such eﬀects is the main diﬃculty. However,
in a series of papers McCaig (2011) and McCaig and Pavcnik (2014a, 2014b) pro-
vide notable exceptions by exploiting the 2001 U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agree-
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ment (BTA). The implementation of the BTA provides an excellent environment to
study the consequences of better access to developed countries’ markets, precisely the
channel through which GSP seeks to accomplish its goals. First, it is a very large
shock from Vietnam’s perspective. Under the BTA, the U.S. immediately granted
Normal Trade Relations to Vietnam, implying that Vietnam would then face MFN
tariﬀs rather than “Column 2” duties, applied to a few countries deemed “commu-
nist.” Manufacturing tariﬀs, for example, fell from an average of 34% to around 3%.
Indeed, Vietnam exports reacted quickly and strongly, but heterogeneously across
industries, depending on the industry tariﬀ cut. Second, the tariﬀ changes were in-
stantaneous, not phased in over many years as usual. Third, although Vietnam also
had commitments under the BTA, they required little trade liberalization and would
be implemented over several years. Fourth, the BTA is largely immune of endogeneity
issues, as the tariﬀ changes represented a simple reclassiﬁcation of Vietnam, entitling
it to move from one pre-determined tariﬀ schedule to another. Neither of them is
plausibly aﬀected by Vietnamese export ﬂows: one is the MFN tariﬀ schedule of the
U.S., deﬁned during the Uruguay Round, which ended in 1994; the other was deﬁned
in the 1930s. Moreover, from the American perspective, Vietnam is a very small
trading partner. The upshot is that the BTA provides a very clean policy shock, en-
tailing liberalization by a large developed economy without reciprocal liberalization
by a small developing country–just like GSP presumes.
McCaig (2011) estimates the impact of the BTA on poverty rates in Vietnam.
Controlling for pre-existing trends, and deﬁning tariﬀ cuts at the province level (based
on pre-BTA sector employment shares), he ﬁnds that the BTA caused a steeper
decrease in poverty rates in the provinces more exposed to the tariﬀ reductions. The
eﬀects are statistically and economically signiﬁcant. The main mechanism appears to
be an increase in the wage rate of unskilled labor, precisely the factor of production
used intensively in the industries that reacted more strongly to the tariﬀ cuts.
McCaig and Pavcnik (2014a) estimate instead how enhanced access to the Amer-
ican market under the BTA aﬀected worker allocation across types of ﬁrms. They
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ﬁnd that the BTA led to worker reallocation from household businesses to formal en-
terprises, especially in areas near major seaports. As a result, aggregate productivity
in Vietnam increased, since formal ﬁrms are on average signiﬁcantly more productive
than household businesses (the estimates depend heavily on the empirical method
employed, though, ranging from a modest 0.1 percent to a very large 5.5 percent).38
Interestingly, in a companion paper McCaig and Pavcnik (2014b) ﬁnd that the BTA
also caused reallocation within the household business sector. In the sectors more
aﬀected by the American tariﬀ cuts, household businesses expanded income and be-
came more likely to hire outside labor. Moreover, the larger household ﬁrms within
those sectors expanded while the smaller ones contracted. Thus, the BTA generated
an expansion of the formal sector relative to the informal sector, at the same time that
it engendered reallocation within the latter. Both channels point toward an increase
in aggregate productivity.
Valuable as the lessons from those studies are, the case of Vietnam and its BTA
with the U.S. is not directly generalizable to preferences under GSP. First, GSP pref-
erences are oﬀered to (almost) all developing countries, whereas the BTA entailed
reclassiﬁcation of Vietnam only. Second, GSP preferences are relative to MFN tariﬀs,
already rather low in most developed economies’ industries, whereas the BTA implied
the end of very high discriminatory tariﬀs against Vietnam. And third, all the un-
certainties discussed above involving GSP are absent in the BTA. For each of those
reasons, although the BTA features several qualitative similarities with liberalization
through GSP, its quantitative impact on Vietnamese exports is considerably larger
than one could ever hope to achieve through GSP. Thus, one may view the impacts
of the BTA on Vietnam’s poverty rate and aggregate productivity as a (generous)
upper bound of what developing countries may achieve through GSP.
Now, when better export opportunities arise from the concession of preferences,
38Paz (2014) shows related evidence for informality in Brazil during the 1990s. In line with
other studies, Paz ﬁnds that Brazil’s own liberalization led to an increase in informality, but that
liberalization in Brazil’s main export markets had the opposite eﬀect. In his underlying model, the
eﬀect of better access in foreign markets on informality arises because existing exporters expand,
and they are more likely to be formal.
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the usual presumption is that the ensuing gains will be kept by the preference-
receiving countries. In a competitive market, that would be the case. However, this
may not happen if importers (or distributors) in the preference-granting countries
have market power.
To my knowledge, Olarreaga and Ozden (2005) provide the only analysis of such
a critical issue. They investigate how AGOA’s preferences aﬀected the prices re-
ceived by apparel exporters in the ﬁrst half of the 2000s (therefore before the end
of the apparel quotas in 2005). Olarreaga and Ozden observe that on average the
export price of AGOA exporters increased by no more than a third of the MFN
tariﬀ, indicating that a large share of the preference rent was in fact captured by
importers/distributors in the U.S. The share accrued to the exporters is especially
low for poorer and smaller countries, which have fewer export alternatives, and in
products with lower MFN tariﬀs. Suggestively, Olarreaga and Ozden (2005) ﬁnd a
strong negative correlation between the preference rent kept by the AGOA exporters
and an index of the concentration of U.S. buyers at the product level. Thus, their
results indicate that preferential market access can be valuable for developing coun-
tries, but that the magnitude of those gains will be strongly aﬀected by the market
structure in the importing country. The recent literature identifying the large size of
importers (e.g. Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott, 2010) and the line of research
emphasizing relationship-speciﬁcity in international transactions (see Antràs, 2015)
suggest that such a possibility is not far-fetched.
4.4 The eﬀect of GSP on recipients’ trade policy
There is a dearth of analyses investigating empirically how nonreciprocal preferences
aﬀects the trade policy of beneﬁciary countries. A notable exception is Ozden and
Reinhardt (2005), who investigate empirically how the concession of GSP aﬀects the
trade policies of recipient countries. They include all 154 countries that beneﬁted from
GSP in the U.S. from the beginning of its program in 1976 until 2000. Identiﬁcation
comes from cross-sectional variation and also from the loss of GSP beneﬁts by some
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countries throughout the period. Ozden and Reinhardt run OLS regressions of diﬀer-
ent measures of trade policies (duties/imports, average tariﬀ, imports/GDP) on GSP
status, controlling for standard covariates. They also employ an IV approach using
distance to the U.S., a dummy indicating a formal alliance with the U.S., and other
arguably exogenous instruments for GSP status. The results indicate that GSP fos-
ters more protectionist policies. A concern is, however, that unobserved heterogeneity
could be driving the results: most of the variation in the dataset is cross-sectional,
which is why the authors do not use country ﬁxed eﬀects in the analysis.
More recently, Crivelli (2015) evaluates empirically how preferential access re-
ceived aﬀects a member’s external tariﬀ. She tests the predictions of her model using
data for several Latin America preferential agreements from Estevadeordal, Freund
and Ornelas (2008), but unlike those authors Crivelli focuses is on preferential access
received, not granted.39 Thus, although the data is for reciprocal FTA liberalization,
her diﬀerent perspective can provide lessons for the consequences of preferences in
nonreciprocal arrangements like GSP. In line with her model, Crivelli (2015) ﬁnds
that high-tariﬀ countries (in a bilateral relationship) tend to signiﬁcantly lower their
external tariﬀs upon receiving preferences. In contrast, low-tariﬀ countries tend to
raise their external tariﬀs after being granted preferences, provided that tariﬀ revenue
is an important source of their governments’ ﬁscal revenues. This raises a concern:
the countries that are more likely to increase tariﬀs because of arrangements like GSP
may be precisely the less developed ones, which tend to rely more heavily on border
taxes to raise ﬁscal revenue.
4.5 The eﬀect of GSP on donors’ trade policies
As the discussion in section 3.4 indicates, oﬀering preferential access in one’s market
has a theoretically ambiguous eﬀect on the trade barriers that the country imposes on
imports coming from non-preferential sources. Empirically, there is a body of research
showing that preferences in free trade areas tend to induce lower external tariﬀs–see
39Crivelli (2015) does, however, control for preferential access granted.
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e.g. Calvo-Pardo, Freund and Ornelas (2011) for ASEAN, Estevadeordal et al. (2008)
for Latin American FTAs, and Ketterer, Bernhofen and Milner (2014a) and Stoyanov
and Mai (2015) for Canada in the context of CUSTA and UR tariﬀ cuts.40 On the
other hand, Limao (2006), Karacaovali and Limao (2008) and Ketterer, Bernhofen
and Milner (2014b) ﬁnd that the U.S., the E.U. and Japan, respectively, lowered
MFN tariﬀs by less during the UR in products where they oﬀered preferences. Many
(although not all) of those preferences were oﬀered in the context of GSP and other
nonreciprocal arrangements.41
Those empirical results, which are broadly in line with the theoretical forces dis-
cussed in section 3.4, indicate that the motive of the preference is critical for its
impact on the trade policies vis-à-vis other countries. When preferences are oﬀered
in the context of reciprocal exchange of market access, as in most FTAs, they tend
to be associated with more liberal external trade policies. However, when prefer-
ences are nonreciprocal (or the reciprocity is with respect to nontrade beneﬁts), as in
the context of Enabling Clause-based arrangements, they tend to be associated with
less liberalization toward third countries. This distinction becomes especially visible
when one compares the results of Ketterer et al. (2014a) and Ketterer et al. (2014b).
The former study how CUSTA preferences aﬀected Canada’s MFN tariﬀs; the lat-
ter study how GSP preferences aﬀected Japan’s MFN tariﬀs. Despite employing an
identical empirical methodology and identiﬁcation strategy in both papers (which
follow Limao’s, 2006, closely), the two analyses yield opposite results. This suggests
that the nonreciprocal nature of SDT-based preferential arrangements can have neg-
40Estevadeordal et al. (2008) show that those ﬁndings do not extend to customs unions. Crivelli
(2014) qualiﬁes the results of Estevadeordal et al. by allowing for heterogeneous eﬀects. She ﬁnds
that the reduction of external tariﬀs following a drop in preferential tariﬀs in free trade areas is
especially strong for the bloc’s highest tariﬀ member (in the sector). In contrast, the tariﬀ comple-
mentarity for the low-tariﬀ countries is either weaker or absent. See Freund and Ornelas (2010),
Maggi (2014) and chapter 14 of this Handbook for broader discussions of the empirical eﬀects of
preferential liberalization on countries’ external trade policies.
41In particular, Ketterer et al. (2014b) consider only GSP preferences, as Japan did not participate
in any reciprocal FTA until the early 2000s. On the other hand, it is worth noting that Limao (2006)
also ﬁnds a similar result for American’s NAFTA preferences.
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ative consequences for the openness of the multilateral system, but that making them
reciprocal could reverse this eﬀect.
A diﬀerent question concerns the motives for oﬀering preferential access in the
ﬁrst place. Which countries should receive preferences, and how extensive should
they be? Blanchard and Matschke (2015) provide compelling evidence that vertical
MNFs are an important force promoting GSP preferences. Using detailed 8-digit
product level data on U.S. foreign aﬃliates and American preferences, their main
challenge is reverse causality: surely U.S. MNFs must be more inclined to locate in
countries that receive preferential treatment in the American market. Blanchard and
Matschke (2015) deal with that diﬃculty using a clever IV strategy. They instrument
for vertical multinational activities with (pure) horizontal multinational activity. The-
ory poses that domestic trade policy should not inﬂuence domestic ﬁrms’ horizontal
multinational choices. On the other hand, vertical and horizontal FDI in a country
are surely positively correlated, as location and the general business climate in the
host country aﬀect both types of investment.
Blanchard and Matschke (2015) ﬁnd that vertical FDI is indeed a strong cause of
preferential access oﬀered by the U.S. The eﬀect is particularly strong for developing
countries, indicating a greater-than-one elasticity between the sales of U.S. MNFs
back to the U.S. and the share of products receiving duty-free treatment. This dif-
ferential eﬀect is largely driven by GSP, which is precisely the dimension in which
the U.S. enjoys more ﬂexibility to oﬀer and withdraw preferences to speciﬁc product-
country pairs.42 Their results thus suggest that, as FDI ﬂows increase overtime, we
should expect a widening of the product and country GSP scopes. Furthermore, fol-
lowing the logic of Blanchard’s (2007) model, such expansion of GSP can be thought
of as a substitute for MFN liberalization.
A similar rationale applies to the impact of GVCs on the pervasiveness and on
the levels of preferences, as discussed in section 3.4. Since the tariﬀs of the largest
42If the U.S. wanted to oﬀer preferences to certain products originating from another developed
economy, it would need to create a full-ﬂedged FTA with that country, and would then need to
satisfy GATT’s Article XXIV requirements to avoid Article I.
59
economies are deﬁned in multilateral negotiations, to test those predictions Blanchard
et al. (2016) focus on bilateral tariﬀs in preferential arrangements. FTAs provide such
variation, but in FTAs reciprocity matters. Moreover, Article XXIV imposes limits on
discretion. Thus, the implications of GVCs for FTA preferences becomes somewhat
blurred. The other main source of variation, where discretion is more permissible–
and therefore the forces in the model of Blanchard et al. can be tested more directly–
are GSP preferences. Using information on the value-added contents of 14 major
economies from 1995 to 2009, Blanchard et al. (2016) conﬁrm that an increase in the
domestic value added of foreign ﬁnal goods leads to lower GSP preferences. Their
results point to interesting trade policy dynamics, where the expansion of global
value chains breeds trade liberalization, and yields in particular more generous tariﬀ
preferences in nonreciprocal arrangements.
5 Concluding remarks and future research
Rules determining special and diﬀerential treatment for developing countries have
been present in the multilateral trading system since the inception of the GATT, and
have extended their reach since the introduction of the Enabling Clause in the 1970s.
The exceptions entail the possibility that developing countries may adopt fewer liber-
alization commitments in multilateral rounds of negotiation; that commitments can
be relatively lax; and that developing countries may simply act as bystanders in mul-
tilateral trade negotiations. One of the consequences of such special and diﬀerential
treatment has been the maintenance of relative high trade barriers, and particularly
large “tariﬀ overhangs,” in developing countries. Another is a tariﬀ structure in in-
dustrialized economies that is biased against products in which developing countries
possess comparative advantage, although they enjoy (qualiﬁed) preferential access in
those markets. Since the Uruguay Round the situation has changed somewhat for
countries acceding to the WTO, but not for old members.
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5.1 Answering the main questions
Returning to the ﬁrst question raised in the Introduction (Is SDT justiﬁable, theo-
retically and/or empirically?), one can conclude that the literature to date oﬀers a
mixed view, but with a clear negative inclination. The main theories of trade agree-
ments, based either on terms of trade or on commitment, oﬀer no basis for SDT.
That literature views developing countries, especially until the Uruguay Round, as
ineﬀective "free riders" of the multilateral trading system. While developed economies
negotiated market access reciprocally and extended the tariﬀ concessions to all GATT
members, developing countries were not required to reciprocate. Although such "free"
market access may have promoted speciﬁc export sectors of bystander GATT mem-
bers, general equilibrium forces dictate that the expansion of their export sectors as a
whole are severely constrained by the lack of their own liberalization. Now, if deloca-
tion and learning eﬀects are important, the role of SDT might be rationalized. This
would require, however, “clever design” of the underlying SDT policies. On top of
requiring information probably unavailable to policymakers, an aggravating problem
is that many SDT policies, such as the nonreciprocal preferences under the General-
ized System of Preferences, are deﬁned by developed economies. It seems unrealistic
to presume that they would design policies having as their primary goal the interests
of developing countries. Indeed, the products and sectors where developing countries
would beneﬁt the most from better foreign market access tend to be the least open
in advanced economies.43
On the empirical side, evaluating the impact of SDT as a whole is challenging,
as isolating its eﬀects is typically unfeasible. An option is to compare the behavior
of similar countries that joined the GATT/WTO system before and after the UR.
Another is to contrast the impact of FTAs based on Article XXIV to those notiﬁed to
the WTO under the Enabling Clause. The few attempts to explore those diﬀerences
point toward a clear beneﬁt in moving away from SDT disciplines.
The dimension of SDT that is more prone to empirical analysis is the Enabling
43See Hoekman, Michalopoulos and Winters (2004) for proposals to make SDT more eﬀective.
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Clause-based preferential arrangements, such as GSP. They could help us answer our
second question: Can/do nonreciprocal preferences provide a sustainable boost to the
exports of developing countries? The gravity-based studies, carried out at a highly
aggregate level and identifying eﬀects mostly from cross-sectional variation, tend to
ﬁnd positive trade eﬀects from GSP, but results are sensitive to econometric technique
and coding deﬁnitions. Further research is needed to pin down more precisely the
source of this sensitivity. Moreover, allowing for diﬀerential eﬀects across sectors
and arrangements reveals signiﬁcant heterogeneity. The handful of analyses that
use disaggregated data (typically at the 6-digit product level) and explore within
variation, on the other hand, unanimously conclude that nonreciprocal preferences
promote exports of the relevant country-product pairs (relative to a control group
without preferences). A concern is, however, the negative impact of the uncertain
nature of the preferences.
Now, even if nonreciprocal preferences indeed promote exports of receiving coun-
tries, the answer to the deeper, more relevant question of whether they promote
economic growth or simply yield rents to selected country-industry pairs (question 3
from the Introduction) remains elusive. There are studies that identify beneﬁts from
better access to the markets of developed countries, ranging from higher ﬁrm produc-
tivity to less poverty and informality. However, while they are useful to understand
the potential beneﬁts of GSP and other arrangements based on nontrade reciprocity,
those studies are not based on them, and thus only reveal the eﬀects from better
foreign market access in general.
In terms of trade policy, by design the set of rules characterizing SDT compel
developing economies to remain relatively closed by letting them stay away from
multilateral trade negotiations. Does that imply that we can conﬁdently answer our
fourth main question, of whether nonreciprocal preferences to developing countries
make their own trade policies more liberal, in the negative? Unfortunately, the the-
oretical literature on this issue is ambiguous, and its empirical counterpart is very
incipient. If anything, they support the view that a one-ﬁts-all answer does not exist.
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Now, the existing schemes of nonreciprocal preferences, whereby developed economies
use preferences as bargaining chips to demand cooperation from developing countries
in nontrade areas, seem to constitute an important force toward keeping multilat-
eral tariﬀs high. This follows from a literature that indicates that nonreciprocal
preferences are associated with tariﬀ substitutability. The ﬂexibility of GSP also
has a similar eﬀect, inducing multinational ﬁrms to push for lower preferential duties,
rather than for lower MFN tariﬀs. This suggests that the answer to our ﬁfth question,
of whether nonreciprocal preferences to developing countries induce the preference-
granting countries to adopt more liberal trade policies, is probably in the negative.
But the literature also indicates that reciprocal exchange of preferential access tends
to yield tariﬀ complementarity. Thus, if preferential tariﬀ negotiations had to occur in
the context of full-ﬂedged FTAs, we may observe instead lower multilateral tariﬀs.44
5.2 Further research
Overall, although signiﬁcant progress has been made, there is still much to learn
about the consequences of SDT. In particular, there is a clear need for more research
whose focus is on SDT. This matters, as many of the its disciplines are likely to stay
in place for the long haul. Moreover, countries are increasingly forming bilateral and
plurilateral trade agreements, but struggling to move forward on GATT-based multi-
lateral negotiations. Thus, it is important to understand, on one hand, whether/how
SDT may be aﬀecting this trade-agreement dynamics. And on the other hand, what
the consequences of those developments tend to be for developing countries and for
the eﬀectiveness (or lack thereof) of SDT-based rules. I outline below a few areas in
which future research could help answer those questions.
Under the lens of the strict version of the terms-of-trade theory of trade agree-
ments, oﬀering nonreciprocal preferences to developing countries is either immaterial
44This, of course, presumes that developing countries would be willing to engage in such arrange-
ments. Put diﬀerently, the counterfactual of banning nonreciprocal preferences is not necessarily
reciprocal FTAs. In the context of the E.U. and the ACP countries, that is (slowly) happening, but
in other contexts banning nonreciprocal liberalization may as well lead to no liberalization at all.
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(if developing countries are assumed small) or unreasonable for the donor countries,
as they would yield a terms-of-trade deterioration with nothing in return. But in re-
ality those preferences are often conditional on the “good behavior” of the beneﬁciary
countries, and on those countries not using the preferences “too much.” This suggests
that incorporating those preferences in the framework of the terms-of-trade theory
would require extending the objective function of negotiating governments to encom-
pass noneconomic issues. At the same time, to integrate graduation and CNL rules
in the analysis, preferences need to be oﬀered conditional on aﬀecting their terms of
trade only up to a point. It would be interesting to see how those extensions would
aﬀect the nature of the equilibrium outcome of multilateral negotiations.
Similarly, the insecurity of preferences in nonreciprocal systems of preferences
based on the Enabling Clause likely aﬀects their trade impact. Nevertheless, this has
not been theoretically or empirically studied yet. Theoretically, the existing analy-
ses of the role of tariﬀ bindings in reducing uncertainty for foreign exporters could
provide a useful framework that could be extended to study GSP. The empirical im-
plementation could also follow that ﬂedgling but growing literature, with the margin
of preferences replacing the tariﬀ overhang as the proxy for trade policy uncertainty
in an initial step.
Another potential interesting area, on which there is currently virtually no re-
search, is the assessment of what/how much developed countries actually gain–if
anything–with their Enabling Clause-based nontrade reciprocity. A possible line
of inquiry could follow the empirical strategy of Berger et al. (2013) and Dube et
al. (2011), who study the consequences of foreign CIA interventions on American
economic outcomes. A related literature studies how the U.S. uses loans and other
types of foreign assistance to enlist support in international organizations from other
countries (see, among others, Dreher and Jensen, 2007).
Another potentially interesting avenue for research would be to investigate how
small developing countries may optimally design their trade policies in the SDT/GSP
context. Such research could be particularly fruitful if developed in a framework based
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on heterogeneous ﬁrms featuring ﬁrm delocation eﬀects. That would allow a tighter
connection with the literature that investigates how trade liberalization and better
access to foreign markets aﬀects aggregate productivity and welfare in a country.
Although that body of research has evolved in many dimensions, only very recently it
has moved toward investigating optimal trade policy.45 As that literature develops, it
could also address the nature of the optimal policy reactions for developing countries
facing preferences in larger, developed markets.
Now, a policy change that could help economists to evaluate empirically the impact
of reciprocal vs. nonreciprocal preferences in developing countries more generally is
the E.U. move toward Economic Partnership Agreements with the African, Caribbean
and Paciﬁc countries. The change was required by the WTO and has been resisted
by several ACP countries. Albeit slowly, the transition is nevertheless happening.
A comparison of the performance of the ACP countries that moved to the recipro-
cal scheme early with those moving later is one dimension that could be explored
empirically, even though the endogeneity of the timing would be an obvious issue.
Alternatively, a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences comparison between the ACP countries that
turn to reciprocal preferences relatively late (simply because they would not have a
more palatable option) and those under GSP that were not given that option would
also shed light on the impact of moving from reciprocal to nonreciprocal preferences.
A diﬃculty is that we still need to wait a few years to make such an evaluation.
Finally, despite increased availability of data, there are surprisingly few product-
level studies on the impact of nonreciprocal preferences on the performance of devel-
oping countries. A few notable papers do use detailed product-level information to
estimate the response of developing country exports to the preferences, but ideally
we would like to know also their impact on ﬁrm and industry productivity, learn-
ing eﬀects and spillovers. After all, those are the formal motives behind the Enabling
45For example, Demidova (2015) studies optimal import policies in a model a la Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008), but with income eﬀects, when liberalization entails reduction of tariﬀs or of non-
tariﬀ trade costs, and for small and large countries. Bagwell and Lee (2015) work instead with
a 2-country version of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and characterize optimal trade policies more
broadly, including export tariﬀs/subsidies, in both Nash and the cooperative equilibria.
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Clause. This would require ﬁrm-level analyses that exploit product eligibility changes
in GSP status.
Appendix: Programs of nonreciprocal preferences
Table A.1 provides basic information on all current Enabling Clause-based programs
of preferential trade liberalization worldwide. It includes their starting year, their
number of beneﬁciaries as of 2014-2015, and their key features. The information in
Table A.1 was compiled from the WTO database on Preferential Trade Arrangements
(http://ptadb.wto.org/) and from the websites of the individual programs. Table A.2
provides the main online source of information for each individual program.
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Table 1: Applied and bound average tariffs for selected WTO members, 2013
Country      
(GDP per capita)
GATT/WTO 
accession date Products
% tariff lines 
bound
AVG bound 
tariff
AVG applied 
tariff
AVG 
overhang
U.S. 1948 All 100 3,5 3,4 0,1
(US$ 53000) Agricultural 100 4,9 5,3 -0,4
Nonagricultural 100 3,3 3,1 0,2
Textiles 100 8 7,9 0,1
Clothing 100 11,6 11,6 0
Brazil 1948 All 100 31,4 13,5 17,9
(US$ 11208) Agricultural 100 35,4 10,2 25,2
Nonagricultural 100 30,8 14,1 16,7
Textiles 100 34,8 23,3 11,5
Clothing 100 35 35 0
India 1948 All 74,4 48,6 13,5 35,1
(US$ 1498) Agricultural 100 113,5 33,5 80
Nonagricultural 70,5 34,6 10,2 24,4
Textiles 69,9 27,8 12,2 15,6
Clothing 58,4 37,5 13 24,5
China 2001 All 100 10 9,9 0,1
(US$ 6807) Agricultural 100 15,8 15,6 0,2
Nonagricultural 100 9,1 9 0,1
Textiles 100 9,7 9,6 0,1
Clothing 100 16,2 16 0,2
Nigeria 1960 All 19,1 118,3 11,7 106,6
(US$ 3005) Agricultural 99,7 150 15,6 134,4
Nonagricultural 7 49,2 11,1 38,1
Textiles 1,4 60 14,1 45,9
Clothing 0 - 20 -
Angola 1994 All 100 59,2 7,3 51,9
(US$ 5783) Agricultural 100 52,8 9,8 43
Nonagricultural 100 60,1 6,9 53,2
Textiles 100 60,4 6,1 54,3
Clothing 100 60 15 45
Thailand 1982 All 75 27,8 11,4 16,4
(US$ 5779) Agricultural 99,8 38,9 29,9 9
Nonagricultural 71,3 25,4 8,3 17,1
Textiles 93,6 28,4 8,7 19,7
Clothing 99,6 30 29,6 0,4
Vietnam 2007 All 100 11,5 9,5 2
(US$ 1910) Agricultural 100 19,1 16,2 2,9
Nonagricultural 100 10,4 8,3 2,1
Textiles 100 10,4 9,6 0,8
Clothing 100 19,9 19,9 0
Source: World Trade Organization Tariff Profiles (http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfile/WSDBTariffPFHome.aspx) and
World Bank.   Obs.: GDP per capita in current U.S. dollars for 2013.
Table 2: Average applied and bound tariffs, selected sectors
AVG applied 
tariff
AVG bound 
tariff
AVG applied 
tariff
AVG bound 
tariff
AVG applied 
tariff
AVG bound 
tariff
AVG applied 
tariff
AVG bound 
tariff
constant 5.843*** 23.97*** 13.76*** 44.42*** 10.09*** 27.46*** 5.339*** 22.90***
(0.655) (4.659) (2.556) (7.511) (1.270) (4.489) (0.681) (4.413)
Developing 4.308*** 19.34*** 1.939 15.00* 10.37*** 7.240 6.527*** 9.117*
(0.767) (5.577) (2.700) (8.517) (1.658) (4.899) (0.897) (4.841)
# obs 126 131 126 131 126 113 126 124
R2 0.181 0.069 0.007 0.023 0.163 0.025 0.206 0.035
Obs.: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
all products agriculture clothing textiles
Table 3: Percentage of tariff lines bound and average applied and bound tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
constant 91.83*** -21.21 5.843*** 19.97*** 23.97*** 130.8*** 18.08*** 105.6***
(3.252) (27.29) (0.658) (3.451) (4.677) (26.36) (4.551) (25.98)
Developing -28.09*** 2.040 5.223*** 1.672 28.49*** -0.0536 24.11*** 0.427
(5.692) (8.248) (0.824) (1.275) (6.190) (7.884) (6.103) (7.961)
Developing*UR 31.54*** 28.99*** -2.422*** -2.197*** -23.94*** -21.72*** -23.87*** -21.32***
(5.277) (4.889) (0.772) (0.766) (5.392) (5.183) (5.067) (4.945)
lnGDPpc 10.78*** -1.351*** -10.15*** -8.302***
(2.630) (0.323) (2.457) (2.425)
test Developing + 
Developing*UR = 0
0.000 0.000 0.000  0.019 0.000 0.0002 0.000 0.0001
# obs 131 129 126 124 131 129 126 124
R2 0.225 0.321 0.241 0.338 0.181 0.270 0.170 0.234
Obs.: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
all products
% tariff lines bound AVG applied tariff AVG bound tariff AVG overhang
Table 4: Tariff lines covered by the American and the European programs of nonreciprocal preferences, 2014
# of tariff 
lines
as % of dutiable 
tariff lines
# of tariff 
lines
as % of dutiable 
tariff lines
# of tariff 
lines
as % of dutiable 
tariff lines
Total number of tariff lines
     Number of MFN duty-free tariff lines
     Number of MFN dutiable tariff lines
Total number of tariff lines
     Number of MFN duty-free tariff lines
     Number of MFN dutiable tariff lines
Number of preferential tariff lines 6137 87,4% 867 51,7% 5274 98,6%
of which: Number of duty-free lines 2994 42,6% 124 7,4% 2872 53,7%
Number of preferential tariff lines 6197 88,2% 917 54,7% 5284 98,7%
of which: Number of duty-free lines 6004 85,5% 731 43,6% 5276 98,6%
Number of preferential tariff lines 6932 98,7% 1603 95,6% 5333 99,7%
of which: Number of duty-free lines 6932 98,7% 1603 95,6% 5333 99,7%
Source: WTO database on Preferential Trade Arrengements.
Obs.: For the U.S., all preferential tariffs are duty-free.
* WTO standard definition of agricultural and non-agricultural goods.
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5351
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Table 5: Imports into the U.S. and the E.U. from beneficiaries of programs of nonreciprocal preferences, as a percent of their total imports
All products Agricultural goods* Non-agricultural goods*
Imports entering MFN duty-free 47,6% 41,1% 48%
Total imports 11,9% 15,7% 11,7%
Imports entering MFN duty-free 5,5% 9,5% 5,2%
Imports eligible for GSP benefits 1,6% 3% 1,5%
Total imports 0,8% 0,4% 0,8%
Imports entering MFN duty-free 0,1% 0,3% 0,1%
Imports eligible for GSP benefits 0,3% 0,1% 0,3%
Total imports 1,1% 1,8% 1,1%
Imports entering MFN duty-free 0,4% 1,3% 0,3%
Imports eligible for AGOA benefits 0,6% 0,3% 0,6%
Total imports 0,3% 0,2% 0,4%
Imports entering MFN duty-free 0,2% 0,1% 0,2%
Imports eligible for CBERA benefits 0,1% 0,1% 0,1%
Total imports 0,3% 0,02% 0,3%
Imports entering MFN duty-free 0,2% 0,1% 0,2%
Imports eligible for CBTPA benefits 0,04% - 0,05%
Imports entering MFN duty-free 59,3% 42,9% 60,4%
Total imports 60,6% 65,3% 60,3%
Imports entering MFN duty-free 38,4% 31,7% 38,8%
Imports eligible for GSP benefits 21% 19,3% 21,1%
Total imports 2,6% 8,9% 2,2%
Imports entering MFN duty-free 2,1% 3,6% 2%
Imports eligible for GSP+ benefits 0,3% 2,9% 0,2%
Total imports 1,9% 2,6% 1,9%
Imports entering MFN duty-free 1% 1,3% 1%
Imports eligible for EBA benefits 0,9% 1,3% 0,9%
Source: WTO database on Preferential Trade Arrengements.
* WTO standard definition of agricultural and non-agricultural goods.
E.U.       
(2012)
All partners
 GSP beneficiaries
 GSP+ beneficiaries 
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Imports from nonreciprocal programs beneficiaries (% of total imports)
U.S.     
(2014)
All partners
GSP beneficiaries
LDC GSP Beneficiaries
 AGOA beneficiaries
CBI/CBERA beneficiaries 
CBI/CBTPA beneficiaries 
Table A.1: Main programs of nonreciprocal tariff preferences active in 2014/2015
Starting Year
# of Beneficiaries 
(2014/2015)
Features
GSP 1976 122 Includes sub-scheme for LDCs.
CBI/CBERA 1983 17 Duty-free access to the U.S. market for most goods of Central America and Caribbean countries. 
AGOA 2000 40
Trade preferences for sub-saharan African countries. There are sub-schemes concerning textiles and apparels for 
some of the beneficiaries.
CBI/CBTPA 2000 8
All  beneficiary countries are also CBERA beneficiaries. CBTPA includes preferences mainly relating to textiles and 
petroleum.
GSP 1971 92 Duty reductions for ca. 66% of all EU tariff lines. 
Everything but Arms 2001 49
 Full duty-free and quota-free access to the EU market for all LDC's exports with the exception of arms and 
armaments.
GSP+ 2009 13
Deeper preferences for almost the same tariff lines as ordinary GSP. Beneficiaries must sign international 
conventions on human and labour rights, sustainable development and good governance.
GSP Japan 1971 151 Includes LDC sub-scheme.
GSP Norway 1971 89 Includes duty free treatment for LDCs and a GSP+ scheme.
GSP New Zealand 1972 141 Includes LDC sub-scheme.
GSP Switzerland 1972 130 Sub-schemes for least-developed countries (LDCs) and countries undergoing debt relief.
GSP Canada 1974 102 Includes LDC sub-scheme.
GSP Australia 1974 165 Includes LDC sub-scheme.
Sparteca 1981 13
Preferences granted by New Zealand and Australia with duty-free and unrestricted access for specified products 
from developing Pacific islands.
Commonwealth Caribbean 
Countries Tariff - Canada
1986 18 Economic and trade development assistance program for the Commonwealth Caribbean countries and territories.
Preferential Tariff for LDCs - 
Republic of Korea
2000 48 LDC specific.
Trade preferences for countries of 
the Western Balkans
2000 6
Trade preferences from the European Union for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro , Serbia, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo.
Duty-free treatment for African 
LDCs - Morocco
2001 33 LDC specific.
GSP Turkey 2002 176 Turkey's GSP is almost fully aligned with EU's GSP. There are sub-schemes for LDCs and other developing countries.
GSP Iceland 2002 48 Access to GSP scheme is exclusive to LDCs.
Nonreciprocal Program 
E.U.
U.S.
Others
Duty-free treatment for LDCs - 
Chinese Taipei
2003 48 LDC specific.
Duty-free treatment for LDCs - 
Kyrgyz Republic
2006 46 LDC specific.
Duty-Free Tariff Preference Scheme 
for LDCs - India
2008 48  LDC specific.
Duty-free treatment for LDCs - 
China
2010 40 LDC specific.
GSP Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia 2010 151 Joint preferences given through countries' custom union.  Includes LDC sub-scheme.
Duty-free treatment for LDCs – 
Chile
2014 49 LDC specific.
Duty-free treatment for LDCs – 
Thailand
2015 48 LDC specific.
Source: WTO database on Preferential Trade Arrengements and programs' websites.
Table A.2: Main sources of information about the programs of nonreciprocal tariff preferences active in 2014/2015
GSP https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/GSP-by-the-numbers-10072014-final.pdf
CBI/CBERA https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/caribbean-basin-initiative-cbi
CBI/CBTPA https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/caribbean-basin-initiative-cbi
AGOA http://trade.gov/agoa/eligibility/index.asp
GSP http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/august/tradoc_153732.pdf
EBA http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/october/tradoc_152839.pdf
GSP+ http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/october/tradoc_152839.pdf
Japan WTO database on Preferential Trade Arrengements
Norway http://www.toll.no/en/corporate/import/free-trade/gsp---generalized-system-of-preference/
GSP New Zealand WTO database on Preferential Trade Arrengements
GSP Switzerland WTO database on Preferential Trade Arrengements
GSP Canada WTO database on Preferential Trade Arrengements
GSP Australia WTO database on Preferential Trade Arrengements
Sparteca http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryGroupingDetails/1
GSP Turkey http://unctad.org/en/Docs/itcdtsbmisc74_en.pdf
GSP Iceland http://esango.un.org/ldcportal/trade/ism/-/asset_publisher/R2dBsjYiLdZ4/content/preferential-market-access-iceland-gsp/19799
GSP Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia WTO database on Preferential Trade Arrengements
LDC-specific schemes WTO database on Preferential Trade Arrengements
Others
E.U.
U.S. 
Information sources:
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Figure 1: Proportion of GSP-eligible tariff lines relative to dutiable MFN tariff lines, U.S.
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Figure 2: Proportion of GSP-eligible imports relative to total dutiable imports, U.S.
All products Agricultural goods Non-Agricultural goods
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